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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND SECTION 1983:
A REAPPRAISAL
ROBERT H. SMITHt
42 U.S. C section 1983 was drafted to provide afederalforum for
litigants who Congressfeared might not receive substantialJusticefrom
a state court The implementing statute for the full faith and credit
clause, 28 U.S. C. section 1738, provides that a state's preclusion rules
should control matters originally litigated in that state. Tkhen a state
court has decided, or could have decided, issues related to a subsequent
1983 action, the underlying purposes of sections 1983 and 1738 are in
direct conflict. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court
may apply section 1738 strictly in such settings and adopt the state's
preclusion rules. Strict application of section 1738 often will deny the
section 1983 litigant access to federal court. Professor Smith discusses
precedent andpolicy that support an exception to aper se application of
fullfaith and credit based on the goals of section 1983. He argues that
the recent Court decisions would support this exception and concludes
that the Court should adopt a case-by-case analysis that evaluates five
specific criteria. The purpose of this analysis is to weigh the underlying
purposes of section 1983 against those offullfaith and credit.
Within a court system, the principles of claim preclusion and issue preclu-
sion' govern the effect of a completed judicial proceeding upon a subsequent
action. These doctrines developed at common law to provide finality to the
resolution of disputes, to conserve judicial resources, and to relieve parties of
the burden of repetitious litigation.2 Claim preclusion, commonly referred to
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Article and Boston College for the summer research grant that supported preparation of this Arti-
cle. The author's greatest debt in this effort is to Jennifer A. Coleman, a student in the class of
1985 at Boston College Law School, for her research, criticism, editing, and encouragement.
1. This Article uses the terminology of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGM]ENTS (1982)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] to describe the preclusive effects of prior judgments on later
civil actions. The traditional terms, res judicata and collateral estoppel, still are employed by
many courts to identify the claim preclusion and issue preclusion consequences of a judgment.
The Supreme Court adopted the Restatement terminology in Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 894 n.l (1984), although it subsequently used the terms "resjudicata"
and "collateral estoppel" in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1801 n.5 (1984),
because the lower court had done so and it was "convenient" to use the same terminology in the
Supreme Court decision. The Restatement terminology conveys more precisely the preclusion
concepts under consideration. "Res judicata" has been used interchangeably to describe the gen-
eral field of preclusion as well as the more particular concepts of merger and bar within claim
preclusion. See infra note 3. The concept of "estoppel" also may be confusing in this context
because parties may be "estopped" from asserting a position in litigation for reasons other than a
prior judgment. For a discussion of these points, see RESTATEMENT, supra, Introduction at 1-5.
2. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("As this Court and other courts have often
recognized, resjudicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
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as res judicata, provides that a final judgment may preclude later relitigation
of claims and defenses that arose from the same transaction and that were
raised, or could have been raised, in the first proceeding. 3 Under issue preclu-
sion, or collateral estoppel, a decision on an issue of fact or law that is neces-
sary to a court's judgment may preclude relitigation of the same issue in a suit
on a different claim involving a party to the first action.
4
Because claim and issue preclusion are common-law doctrines, the fed-
eral courts and each state court system are free to develop their own preclusion
principles. The modem approach, exemplified by the federal court system and
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, has increased the use of both preclu-
sion forms.5 Because many states have retained traditional limitations on pre-
clusion contrary to this modem trend, however, significant differences in the
scope of the preclusion doctrine exist.
6
"Full faith and credit" considerations arise when a second action is
brought in either a different state court or in federal court. Neither the consti-
tutional clause7 nor its implementing statutes establish interstate preclusion
rules. Instead, they provide that state and federal courts should apply the
lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance
on adjudication."). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note I, Introduction at 11-12.
3. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Claim preclusion has two constituent princi-
ples-merger and bar. The general rule of merger is that a valid and final judgment in favor of a
plaintiff will extinguish all claims that the plaintiff had against the defendant arising from the
same transaction. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 18. The plaintiff may sue on the judgment,
but he may not maintain a separate action on the original claim or any part thereof. A defend-
ant's defenses also are merged in the judgment so that he cannot avail himself of defenses he
might have interposed, or did interpose, in the first action. Id The general rule of bar is that a
valid and final judgment in favor of the defendant prohibits another action by the plaintiff on the
same claim. See id. §§ 19-20. Both the merger and bar aspects of claim preclusion apply to claims
and defenses that could have been litigated, but were not, as well as those that actually were
litigated and determined. Id. § 18 comment a & § 19.
4. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 27-28.
5. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introduction at 10.
6. For example, federal preclusion doctrine differs from that of many state courts in the
mutuality required for application of issue preclusion. Compare Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1979) (defendant precluded from raising defense in private suit that had been raised
unsuccessfully in SEC enforcement action) and Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (finding of patent invalidity precluded plaintiff's later action
against different alleged infringer) with Eliason Corp. v. Bureau of Safety and Regulation, 564 F.
Supp. 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (first suit against sheriff did not bar later suit against his deputies-
lack of privity). Federal preclusion doctrine also differs in the breadth of the concept of "same
claim" for claim preclusion purposes. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 24 comment a (1982);
Ferriell, Res Judicata in Ohio: Preclusion of Causes ofAction or Claims? 10 OHio N.U.L. REV. 241
(1983).
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Section 1738 provides:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Terri-
tory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal
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claim and issue preclusion rules of the state that decided the first action. Thus,
if the rendering state would bar the subsequent action in its own courts, the
second forum (whether another state or federal court) should bar the action
despite its own, possibly differing preclusion doctrine.
The strict application of the full faith and credit doctrine, however, may
interfere with strong policies or interests of the second forum, and on occasion
full faith and credit has been deferred when the second forum's interests were
considered paramount. For example, the Supreme Court has denied preclu-
sive effect to state court judgments that interfered with another state's sover-
eignty over matters of particular local concern9 and to judgments that
conflicted with congressional grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts.' 0
This Article discusses the conflict between full faith and credit and the
legislative purposes of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, in which Congress estab-
lished both a federal remedy for violations of constitutional rights, section
1983,11 and jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear such claims, section
1343.12 The legislative history and subsequent judicial construction of sec-
tions 1983 and 1343 indicate that they were intended to create a "uniquely
federal remedy"; state courts could not be trusted to vindicate the federal
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that
the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Terri-
tories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.
9. For a discussion of examples of full faith and credit yielding to substantive policies of the
second forum, see infra text accompanying notes 156-206.
10. For a discussion of decisions in which full faith and credit was not accorded to state court
judgments because of a conflict between the state judgment and a congressional scheme of federal
remedies and jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 207-242.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). Section 1343 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the depri-
vation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by an act done in fur-
therance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in prevent-
ing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were
about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens
or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Con-
gress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
1984]
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rights the statutes sought to enforce.' 3
The specific conflict arises in federal litigation that follows a state court
judgment ("state-federal" litigation). When a state court has made determina-
tions that would be conclusive under that state's preclusion rules, is a federal
court ever justified in permitting subsequent litigation under section 1983 be-
cause of its "uniquely federal" nature?
In Allen v. McCurry,14 Haring v. Prosise,15 and Mira v. Warren City
School District Board of Education,16 the Supreme Court has provided the
framework for answering this question. The Court stated in Allen that section
1983 actions generally are subject to issue preclusion principles because the
legislative purpose of section 1983 does not require or justify a blanket excep-
tion to full faith and credit.17 Migra, the most recent Supreme Court decision,
extended the ruling in Allen to apply claim preclusion to section 1983 actions
as well and identified state law, rather than federal, as governing preclusion.' 8
The Court indicated in Haring, however, that a federal court need not apply a
strict state rule of preclusion in cases in which such an application would vio-
late the "'understanding of [section] 1983"'19 regarding the special role of
federal courts in enforcing federal rights.
Read together, Allen, Haring, and Migra suggest that the legislative intent
of section 1983 may support case-by-case exceptions to state rules of preclu-
sion. None of the decisions, however, develops a specific rationale for a sec-
tion 1983 exception to full faith and credit or an explanation of what the scope
and application of such an exception would be. Although Haring espoused a
flexible view of full faith and credit, Haring appears at odds with portions of
the Migra opinion and also with the Court's ruling one year earlier in Kremer
v. Chemical Construction Corp.20 The Kremer Court concluded that full faith
and credit required strict application of state preclusion doctrine in federal
employment discrimination actions under Title VII.2
1
The thesis of this Article is that strong policy and precedent support a
more flexible application of full faith and credit principles in section 1983 liti-
gation than the Supreme Court has recognized. The Article will demonstrate
13. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-42 (1972), the Court noted:
Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal
remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon nghts secured
by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. . . . [Congress] was concerned that state
instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in
fact, be antipathetic to vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings
extended to the state courts.
For a further discussion of the legislative histories and purposes of§§ 1983 and 1343, see infra text
accompanying notes 241-68.
14. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
16. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
17. Alen, 449 U.S. at 104-05.
18. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 897-98.
19. Haring, 103 S. Ct. at 2373 (quoting ,4len, 449 U.S. at 101).
20. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
21. Id. at 485.
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that the Court has not strictly applied the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions regarding full faith and credit in other settings in which the provisions
conflicted with important state or federal policies of the second forum. The
significant, well-established congressional intent behind section 1983-to pro-
vide a choice of federal or state forums-justifies an exception to rote applica-
tion of the normal rules of preclusion in those instances in which the purpose
of section 1983 is jeopardized by a per se preclusion rule.
This Article first analyzes the four recent Supreme Court decisions: Allen,
Kremer, Haring, and Migra. It then reviews prior full faith and credit prece-
dent to demonstrate the flexibility inherent in that doctrine. Finally, it
presents a method of analysis for preclusion issues in section 1983 litigation
that permits federal courts to deviate from state rules of preclusion to fulfill the
legislative purposes of section 1983.
I. ALLEN, KREMER, HARiN, AND MIGAJ
Lower courts and commentators were divided over resolution of the di-
lemma posed by preclusion defenses in section 1983 litigation prior to the Al-
len decision. 22 On one hand, institutional pressures and doctrinal
22. See, e.g., the decisions cited in Allen, 449 U.S. at 97 n.10 and in the court of appeals
decision in McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 797-98 nn.2-9 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90
(1980). Almost all of the lower federal courts had concluded that § 1983 "presents no categorical
bar to the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel concepts," Allen, 449 U.S. at 97;
several courts had suggested that normal rules of claim preclusion should not apply. Id
Because of the legislative purpose to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of the
federal issues, most commentators concluded that § 1983 actions should be subject to special rules
of preclusion. See, e.g., Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgments, 44 U.
COLO. L. REv. 191 (1972) (federal courts should be able to rehear § 1983 cases without reference
to res judicata in some circumstances); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on
Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (pt. 2), 60 VA. L. REv. 250, 276 (1974) (discusses
situations in which relitigation of § 1983 claims in federal court should be allowed; § 1738 not
discussed as basis for analysis); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to
the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859, 878 (1976) (section 1738's language should not be read to bar
relitigation of civil rights cases); Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Section 1983 Litiga-
tion in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 185, 212 (1974) (principles of preclusion ordinarily
should control and relitigation should not be allowed); Comment, Res Judicata and Section 1983:
The Effect of State Court Judgments on Federal Civil Rights Actions, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177, 221-
22 (1979) (recommends balance between conflicting policies in favor of res judicata and unencum-
bered access to federal court in § 1983 actions); Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect to be
Given State Court Judgments in Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1504-
08 (1980) (discusses Allen court of appeals decision; maintains that collateral estoppel from state
criminal proceedings should not bar subsequent § 1983 action); Note, The Preclusive Effect of
State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610 (1978) (discusses relationship
of §§ 1738 and 1983; supports structured exception for § 1983 from literal, statutory command of
full faith and credit); Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1135-36 & 1343 (1977)
(discusses full faith and credit; concludes that when § 1983 litigant did not exercise his choice of
forum, he should not be barred from bringing action in federal court); Note, Exception to Preclu-
sion Princples in Section 1983 Actions Brought to Vindicate Fourth Amendment Violations, 11 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 136 (1980) (written after court of appeals decision in Allen and before United
States Supreme Court review; advocates balancing interest in federal-state comity with federal
interest in constitutional adjudication, but does not discuss § 1738); Note, Relitigation of Fourth
Amendment Claims Under Section 1983, Federalism and the Illusory Right to a FederalForum, 1980
U. ILL. L.F. 783 (1980) (section 1738 should preclude § 1983 litigants from bringing fourth
amendment claims in federal court after the claims have been adjudicated in state court). But see
Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 349-50 (1978) ("The fash-
ionable conclusion that § 1983 cases are exceptional for res judicata purposes is a product of
1984]
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developments encouraged the use of preclusion doctrines to screen cases al-
ready heard in state court: the caseload of federal courts was growing rapidly,
particularly in civil rights areas;23 the Court was encouraging the use of com-
ity-based doctrines of abstention and deference toward state proceedings;
24
and the Court had endorsed the expanded application of claim and issue pre-
clusion in other than section 1983 cases. 25 On the other hand, preclusion
seemed inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions which had established that
the legislative purpose of sections 1983 and 1343 was to make a federal forum
available, as an alternative to state court, to hear claims of deprivation of con-
stitutional rights under color of state law.
26
Prior to Allen, few courts or commentators considered the full faith and
credit statute (section 1738) central to the analysis of preclusion questions in
section 1983 actions. 27 The uncertainty regarding the role of section 1738 in
state-federal litigation was created in part by Supreme Court decisions not
involving section 1983 that were handed down in the two Court terms prior to
Allen. For example, the Court had discussed section 1738 extensively in a case
involving successive state proceedings for workers' compensation benefits.
28
In contrast, the Court had based its decisions on federal preclusion principles
without reference to section 1738 or state law in two decisions involving claim
preclusion defenses in state-federal litigation.29 Furthermore, in opinions
prior to Allen, the Court had referred to possible application of the preclusion
wishful thinking"; federal courts should respect congressional command in § 1738 and apply state
rather than federal rules of preclusion.).
23. In 1966 there were 218 civil rights actions brought by state prisoners in federal court,
This number had increased to 12,540 by 1980. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 62 (1980). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13
(1981) (Powell. J., concurring); Comment, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Cur-
tailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1035
(1982).
24. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (Federal courts should abstain when federal
suit would interfere with pending state juvenile proceedinp in which federal claims could be
raised.); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Federal courts m habeas corpus proceeding may not
reconsider state court rulings on fourth amendment issues.); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)
(abstention applied to allow state courts to construe ambiguous state abortion laws).
25. The Supreme Court permitted the offensive and defensive use of issue preclusion, with-
out mutuality, to the fullest extent permitted by due process in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979), and Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
26. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (see supra note 13). See, e.g., McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (Section 1983 plaintiff may have direct access to federal court with-
out resorting to state administrative remedies.); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Section 1983
is a federal remedy that supplements state-law remedies; federal court is available as an alterna-
tive forum because state courts may not enforce fourteenth amendment rights.).
27. Section 1738 provides that "judicial proceedings. . . shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States. . .as they have by law or usage in the court of
such State, Territory or Possessions from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Few of
the lower court opinions involving § 1983 actions noted in Allen by the Supreme Court even men-
tioned § 1738, and none of them considered the statute dispositive. Allen4 449 U.S. at 97 n.10.
Similarly, several of the articles on preclusion in § 1983 actions did not discuss § 1738, and those
commentators who did address the statute were split on whether it should govern § 1983 actions.
See supra note 22.
28. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). See infra text accompanying
notes 183-206.
29. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
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doctrines to section 1983 actions without mentioning section 1738.30
A. Allen v. McCurry
The Allen decision established the proposition that state-federal litigation
under section 1983 is subject to section 1738 and principles of issue preclu-
sion.31 The Supreme Court, however, did not determine the extent to which
section 1738 mandates that state preclusion doctrine, rather than federal prin-
ciples, must govern.
In Allen, plaintiff McCurry sued police officers under section 1983 for
damages arising from an allegedly unconstitutional search of his home. In a
previous criminal prosecution, a state court had denied McCurry's motion to
suppress evidence seized in the search and had ruled that his fourth amend-
ment rights had not been violated.32 A federal district court granted summary
judgment to defendant police officers in the subsequent section 1983 action on
the basis of issue preclusion. The federal district court concluded that Mc-
Curry's fourth amendment claim had been litigated and determined against
him in the state court suppression hearing.33 The court of appeals reversed
and held that issue preclusion should not be applied to a section 1983 claim
raising search and seizure issues "because of the special role of federal courts
in protecting civil rights," and because habeas corpus would be unavailable to
McCurry as a means of federal review after Stone v. Powell.34
See infra text accompanying notes 220-24 (discussing Brown); text accompanying notes 235-42
(discussing Montana).
30. There was mention of the issue of preclusion in § 1983 actions and some dicta approving
lower court application of preclusion in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 437 (1975); Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 509 n.14 (1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 252 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971). None of these cases, however, made any reference to § 1738
or full faith and credit principles.
31. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95-96, 105.
32. The state trial court "denied the suppression motion in part." Id at 91. McCurry had
moved to suppress all evidence seized by the police in their search of his apartment. The trial
court ruled lawful the police entry and seizure of items in plain view, but ruled that the search of
McCurry's dresser and of tires on his porch, without a warrant, exceeded the bounds of the fourth
amendment. This ruling, as well as McCurry's conviction on drug possession and assault charges,
was affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
33. The district court construed McCurry's § 1983 complaint to question the police entry and
search of his apartment, not merely the extension of the search beyond permissible limits. The
court concluded that the validity of the entry and search for items in plain view had been deter-
mined in the portion of the state ruling that refused to suppress that evidence. McCurry v. Allen,
466 F. Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd4 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
34. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 779 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). The court
of appeals concluded that McCurry should have an opportunity for federal court consideration of
his federal constitutional claim and that a § 1983 action was his only vehicle for such review after
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone established that a state prisoner may not obtain recon-
sideration of fourth amendment claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding if he has been pro-
vided a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate those issues in the state criminal prosecution. Id at
481-82, 494. The court of appeals in Allen ruled that normal rules of preclusion should not apply
in § 1983 suits raising such fourth amendment issues. Allen, 606 F.2d at 799, rev'd, 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
The court of appeals also reversed the decision of the district court because the district court
overlooked McCurry's allegation that he had been assaulted unlawfully on arrest by the police
1984]
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The lower court opinions in Allen, typical of most district and circuit
court opinions facing these issues, did not address either section 1738 or state
law.35 Although the briefs to the Supreme Court in Allen did refer to section
1738, neither party relied on the section and neither considered it dispositive.
36
Thus, the case was not presented to the Court as one of statutory interpretation
involving section 1738, but as a conflict between federal principles of issue
preclusion and the access to federal court encouraged by section 1983.
Before the Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that the state suppression rul-
ing should not be given effect because the legislative purpose of section 1983
would be defeated if he were forced to accept, as an involuntary litigant, the
adjudication of his federal claim by a state court. Drawing on supportive lan-
guage in the legislative debates and Supreme Court decisions interpreting sec-
tion 1983, McCurry asserted that distrust of state court fact-finding was the
basis for the creation of sections 1983 and 1343. Therefore, he argued that in
section 1983 actions, prior state court adjudications should not be accorded
their usual deference.
37
Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of six justices, identified two coun-
tervailing arguments favoring preclusion. First, when a federal court consid-
ers prior state proceedings, issue preclusion serves not only its normal
purposes of finality and judicial economy, "but also promote[s] the comity
between state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the
federal system." 38 Second, section 1738 mandates that federal courts give
judgments of state courts the same full faith and credit as the judgments would
be given in the issuing court.39 Thus, the central question in Allen, as framed
by Justice Stewart, was whether the legislative history of section 1983 indi-
cated an intent on the part of Congress to override section 1738 and the corre-
sponding principles of comity.40
officer. This assertion was not barred on preclusion grounds because the issue had not been raised
or determined by the state court. Id at 797. The court directed the district court, on remand, "to
temporarily abstain until the Missouri courts [in McCurry's pending criminal appeal] have had
the opportunity to directly review appellant's conviction and the underlying search of his home."
Id. at 799.
35. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'a 449 U.S. 90 (1980); McCurry v.
Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'a 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rey'd, 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
36. Petitioners urged application of the federal rules of preclusion, not state doctrine under
§ 1738. "Petitioners rely on § 1738 merely in adducing an additional reason for applying a federal
rule of collateral estoppel to this case, although § 1738 could undoubtedly serve as an independent
basis for reversing the Court of Appeals." Brief for Petitioners at 25 n.5, Allen. Respondent
argued that § 1738 was avoided because of the countervailing and compelling federal policies
behind §§ 1983 and 1343. Brief for Respondent at 35.
37. Brief for Respondent at 9-16, Allen.
38. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
39. Id
40. Id at 97-98. The concept of comity is applicable whenever a court is asked to address
matters that already have been considered or may be considered by courts of another sovereign.
Comity suggests respect for, and deference to, judgments of another court system in international
law contexts. In the American federal system, comity has special significance as a princple of self-
restraint on the part of federal courts in relation to state courts. This federalism principle of
comity is "'[tihe scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which
[Vol. 63
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The majority noted that the judicial doctrines of claim and issue preclu-
sion were well established in 1871. In enacting section 1983, Congress pre-
sumably was aware that those doctrines, in conjunction with section 1738,
would not allow relitigation of section 1983 claims in federal court. The Court
addressed the issue as one of implied repeal-whether section 1983 was in
irreconcilable conflict with section 173841-because the Civil Rights Act of
1871 did not repeal expressly either section 1738 or those common-law
doctrines.
Justice Stewart found "only the most equivocal support"42 for the propo-
sition that section 1983 is in irreconcilable conflict with section 1738 and com-
mon-law preclusion principles. He noted that Congress, when it enacted
section 1983, created a new federal cause of action and a new category of
federal jurisdiction, but did not intrude on the concurrent jurisdiction of state
courts over federal issues. Justice Stewart concluded that in the absence of an
explicit repeal of either section 1738 or the common-law doctrines of preclu-
sion, the fairest reading of the legislative history was that Congress did not
intend to restrict state court jurisdiction or the effect of state court judgments
when "state courts have recognized the constitutional claims asserted and pro-
vided fair procedures for determining them."
43
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
He did not address the application of section 1738, however, or the majority's
implied-repeal analysis. Instead, the dissent stated that the issue was "whether
a common law doctrine is to apply to [section] 1983 when the statute itself is
silent."44 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that preclusion principles should
be applied in section 1983 cases, but argued that they should be applied with a
flexibility reflecting "the policies underlying section 1983." 45 The dissent re-
jected the majority's per se ruling that section 1983 actions are subject to issue
preclusion because of concern for potential conflict between preclusion princi-
should at all times actuate the federal courts.'" Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary,
454 U.S. 100, 108 (1981) (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932)).
41. Allen, 449 U.S. at 99. The majority cited Radzanower v. Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S.
148 (1976), for the proposition that "repeals by implication are disfavored." Allen, 449 U.S. at 99.
The Court presented two well-settled bases for finding that a subsequent statute repeals an earlier
one by implication: when "provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict," and when the
"later act covers the entire subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute."
Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154. Only the first ground (irreconcilable conflict) was arguable in 41en.
42. Allen, 449 U.S. at 99.
43. Id Justice Stewart rejected any presumption that state courts will not consider federal
constitutional claims competently and sympathetically. Despite § 1983's legislative purposes and
context, he saw no basis for "a general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct
decisions on constitutional issues." Justice Stewart reaffirmed previous expressions of "the consti-
tutional obligation of state courts to uphold federal law" and of the Supreme Court's "confidence
in their ability to do so." Id at 105.
44. Id at 106 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun, analogizing to
cases that had considered the incorporation of common-law immunities in § 1983, suggested that
§ 1983 incorporated the preclusion doctrines as they were established in 1871. He, however, rea-
soned that the doctrines should apply only as long as their rationale was "'compatible with the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act."' Id. at 106 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 662, 638 (1980)).
45. Id at 113 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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pies and the policy favoring access to a federal forum in specific cases. In-
stead, the dissent favored a case-by-case accommodation of preclusion and
section 1983's choice-of-forum purpose. Justice Blackmun would consider "all
relevant factors in each case before concluding that preclusion was
warranted."
46
The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of section 1983 and its
legislative history, and the majority's narrow focus on procedural fairness as
the touchstone for the application of preclusion. The dissent asserted that the
Congress which enacted section 1983 was not concerned solely that procedures
were unfair in state courts, but also "believed that substantive justice was un-
obtainable" in them.47
Several key aspects of the Allen decision were left ambiguous. First, the
opinion did not clearly rest its holding on section 1738 and state rules of pre-
clusion. The majority chose to address only the "broad question of the appli-
cability of collateral estoppel to section 1983 suits"; "questions as to the scope
of collateral estoppel with respect to the particular issues in th[e] case [were]
not. . . before [the court]."'48 Although the opinion referred to section 1738
and its mandate that state law govern, that reference was given as "back-
ground" for the examination of "the relationship of [section] 1983 and collat-
eral estoppel." 49 Justice Stewart did not state, as a holding, that section 1738
and state law govern-at key points in the opinion he hedged by referring
instead to the "normal rules of collateral estoppel," 50 the "conventional doc-
trine of collateral estoppel,"''s the "common-law rules of collateral estop-
pel,' '52 and the "traditional doctrine of preclusion. ' 53 The role of section 1738
in suits under section 1983 therefore was left uncertain.
A second ambiguity in Allen was the degree of flexibility that the courts
46. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited three factors in Allen that weighed
against application of issue preclusion: (1) the doctrine, as it was understood in 1871 when § 1983
was enacted, would not have precluded McCurry from relitigating the fourth amendment issue
(because collateral estoppel did not extend to civil cases); (2) the particular state proceeding (a
suppression hearing) and the review of the constitutional issue in the proceeding were different
from the procedure and consideration that a federal court would give a § 1983 claim; and (3) the
criminal defendant did not choose voluntarily to litigate his fourth amendment claim in state
court-he was an involuntary litigant in state court subject to irresistible pressure to raise all
possible defenses to avoid conviction. Id at 114-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Id at 108 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The legislators perceived that justice was not being done in the States then dominated by
the Klan, and it seems senseless to suppose that they would have intended the federal
courts to give full preclusive effect to prior state adjudications. That supposition would
contradict their obvious aim to right the wrongs perpetuated in those same courts.
Id at 108-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id at 93 n.2.
49. Id at 96.
50. E.g., id at 95 n.7; id at 97 n.10.
51. Id at 95 n.7.
52. Id at 99.
53. Id at 98. In the concluding statement of the holding, the opinion ambiguously referred
to the "doctrine of collateral estoppel" as applicable to § 1983 and reiterated in a footnote that the
Court did not pass on how the "body of collateral estoppel doctrine or 28 U.S.C. § 1738 should
apply in this case." Id at 105 n.25.
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are to use in applying issue preclusion. The Court appeared to conclude that
state rulings must be accorded preclusive effect as long as the party had a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue.54 Nevertheless, in response to the
dissent's criticism that this rule effectively fashioned a new doctrine of preclu-
sion for section 1983 cases "more strict and more confining than the federal
rules of preclusion applied in other cases," 55 the majority stated that it was not
establishing any new doctrine of preclusion.56 Exceptions to preclusion, in
addition to the "full and fair opportunity" test, might be appropriate in section
1983 actions.
Finally, the majority and dissenters disagreed over the applicability of the
Allen decision to claim preclusion. The dissenters concluded that the major-
ity's articulation of its rule-whether the litigant had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate-would bar litigation of issues that might have been raised, as well
as issues that actually were litigated and determined.57 The majority disputed
this assertion, however, and expressly limited its ruling to issue preclusion,
reserving the question of claim preclusion in section 1983 cases.
58
In summary, the Allen decision established that section 1983 suits gener-
ally are subject to the doctrine of issue preclusion, but it did not identify
clearly whether state rules applied under section 1738 or federal common-law
principles would govern. It recognized an exception to preclusion when the
party did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in state court,
and left open the possibility of other exceptions to preclusion in section 1983
actions.
B. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.
The decisions in Haring and Migra clarified some of the ambiguities in
Allen about section 1983 actions. First, however, the Court applied section
1738 to a Title VII employment discrimination action in Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp.59 Kremer adopted a relatively narrow and inflexible read-
ing of section 1738 that appears to conflict with the implications of Allen and
Haring. In light of Haring and other section 1738 precedent,60 some of
54. Id at 101.
55. Id at 112-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. The Court noted:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent,. our decision today does not "fashion" any
new, more stringent doctrine of collateral-estoppel, nor does it hold that the collateral
estoppel effect of a state-court decision turns on the single factor of whether the State
gave the federal claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate a federal question. Our
decision does not "fashion" any doctrine of collateral estoppel at all. Rather, it construes
§ 1983 to determine whether the conventional doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to
the case at hand. It must be emphasized that the question whether any exceptions or
qualifications within the bounds of that doctrine might ultimately defeat a collateral-
estoppel defense in this case is not before us.
Id. at 95 n.7.
57. Id at 113 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 97 n.10.
59. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 124-242.
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Kremes conclusions regarding section 1738 in a Title VII setting are not
transferable to a section 1983 context. The relatively inhospitable attitude ex-
pressed in Kremer towards extending the availability of a federal forum be-
yond the express provisions of Title VII are more a reflection of the Court's
attitude toward the Title VII remedial scheme than they are a construction of
section 1738 that is fully applicable in section 1983 contexts.
Plaintiff in Kremer was barred from litigating a claim under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act6 1 on the basis of prior proceedings under a compara-
ble New York employment discrimination statute. A state agency had con-
cluded that the complaint did not show probable cause of discrimination
based on age or national origin.62 Kremer unsuccessfully sought review of the
administrative decision in state court, which upheld the agency action under a
limited judicial review standard.63 Subsequently, plaintiff brought suit in fed-
eral court under Title VII on the same alleged discrimination; the district court
dismissed the action on preclusion grounds.64 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
65
Justice White, writing for a five-justice majority, first analyzed section
1738's directive that the federal courts give the same effect to a state court
judgment as would the courts of the judgment state. Kremer was precluded by
state statute from bringing any other suit based on the same grievance in New
York courts. 66 Justice White concluded that "[b]y its terms, therefore, [sec-
tion] 1738 would appear to preclude Kremer from relitigating the same ques-
tion in federal court."
67
The majority opinion considered and rejected two possible.escape routes
from section 1738's bar to the action: that Title VII's provisions for federal
court de novo consideration of discrimination claims were an implied repeal
of section 1738's full-faith-and-credit principle because Title VII and section
1738 were irreconcilable, and that the New York judgment should not be
given preclusive effect because the procedures provided were constitutionally
inadequate.
To determine whether section 1738 was in irreconcilable conflict with Ti-
tle VII, the opinion reviewed the legislative history of Title VII and the com-
plex procedural relationship between state and federal agencies in effectuating
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-5(c) (1982).
62. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 464. Plaintiff initially filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC, pursuant to a Title VII require-
ment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982), referred Kremer's charge to the state agency responsible for
the enforcement of the New York statute that prohibits employment discrimination. Id at 463-64,
63. Id. at 464. Under the governing New York statute, the reviewing court may reverse the
agency determination that no probable cause exists only if that determination is "arbitrary, capri-
cious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297-a(7)(e) (McKinney 1982), quoted in Kremer, 456 U.S. at 491.
64. Allen, 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'g 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S.
461 (1982).
65. .4len, 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff' 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
66. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1982), quoted in Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467.
67. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467.
[Vol. 63
PRECLUSION IN SECTION 1983 CASES
Title VII's enforcement.68 Applying a "cardinal principle of statutory con-
struction," Justice White concluded that section 1738 and Title VII could and
should be read consistently. When claimants seek state judicial review they
will be bound by the state outcome in a subsequent federal action to the same
extent that they would have been if the subsequent action had been brought in
state court.
69
Plaintiff's other argument, based on Allen, was that the New York pro-
ceeding was so "fundamentally flawed" that it should have been "denied rec-
ognition under [section] 1738."70 Justice White recognized the Allen limitation
on preclusion-that the party must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the claim or issue-but acknowledged that previous decisions had not
"specified the source or defined the content" of the full-and-fair-opportunity
standard.71 Justice White then identified, at least for section 1738 cases, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the source of this limita-
tion on full faith and credit.
72
Using the due process clause as the constitutional basis for the full-and-
fair-opportunity test justifies its status as an exception to section 1738, but at
the same time limits dramatically the test's scope and significance. As a con-
stitutional prerequisite, it supercedes a state's preclusion rules. 73 A state may
not give effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment; thus, a
federal court that refuses to preclude a claim or issue that was not fully and
fairly heard in state court would be giving the state court judgment the "same
full faith and credit" as would the rendering state's courts.74
This rationale for the full-and-fair-opportunity exception to section 1738
also restricts its scope. The Supreme Court previously had defined this excep-
tion to preclusion more broadly: "Redetermination of issues is warranted if
there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures
followed in prior litigation."75 This earlier articulation of the standard con-
noted a more flexible and searching review of the nature of the state proceed-
68. Id at 468-78.
69. The majority and dissent both agreed that Title VII provides de novo consideration by a
federal court of a discrimination claim after deliberations by either a state or federal administra-
tive agency. Thus, plaintiff had an unimpeded right to bring a federal civil action after the ad-
verse action by the New York agency. Title VII, however, neither requires claimants to pursue
state judicial review of an unfavorable administrative determination nor specifies the weight to be
given a state judgment if such a remedy is sought. The majority concluded that plaintiff's decision
to seek state court review was not governed by provisions in Title VII and, therefore, was subject
to the consequences of preclusion under § 1738. Id at 469-70.
70. Id at 480.
71. Id at 481.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
74. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482.
75. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.l 1 (1979).
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ing. Justice White, however, indicated in Kremer that "state proceedings need
do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full-faith-
and-credit guaranteed by federal law." 76 The Kremer Court concluded that,
under this minimal requirement test, "Kremer received all the process that was
constitutionally required" in the New York administrative proceedings.
77
The dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens criticized the
application of section 1738 to the New York judicial review proceeding be-
cause of the limited scope of the state court's determination.78 The dissenters
also disagreed with Justice White's narrow application of the full-and-fair-
opportunity exception to section 1738.
79
The heart of the dispute between the majority and the dissent in Kremer
was whether federal principles of preclusion may be employed in issue preclu-
sion analysis. The majority opinion presented a simplistic reading of section
1738 in which federal doctrine is irrelevant-section 1738 directs that state
preclusion law governs and the only exceptions to it must be intended by Con-
gress (express or implied repeal of section 1738)80 or must be of a consititu-
tional dimension (due process or full and fair opportunity to litigate).8 In
contrast, the dissenters would have permitted federal consideration of
Kremer's claim because of federal principles that limit the application of issue
preclusion.8
2
The dissenters could have challenged, but did not, however, Justice
White's statement that "[iut has long been established that [section] 1738 does
not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res judicata in determin-
76. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
77. Id. at 483.
78. The dissenters concluded that because the New York statute provided such a limited
basis for reversal of agency action, see pra note 63, the issue before the New York court-
whether "a rational adjudicator might have resolved the discrimination issue either way," Kremer,
456 U.S. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting)-was not the same issue that would have been before a
federal court in a de novo action under Title VII. They concluded that no preclusion could result
from the New York proceeding under federal issue preclusion standards because of this difference
between the issue decided by the New York court and the issue before the federal district court,
Id. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 509-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. The dissenters would apply the broader federal limitation on preclusion set forth in Mon-
tana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n. 11 (1979); thus, relitigation may be justified if there is
reason to doubt the "quality, extensiveness or fairness of procedures." Id The nature of the New
York judicial proceeding, with its limited review of agency action, led the dissenters to the conclu-
sion that it need not be given the same preclusive effect as a de novo proceeding in a state court.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 494 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. "Allen v. McCurry made clear that an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a
later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468 (citation
omitted). "Such a fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion, enacted into fed-
eral law, can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress." Id at 485.
81. Id. at 481-85.
82. The dissenters argued that the federal court should provide de novo consideration despite
New York's statutory bar because of the difference in the issues before the two courts. They relied
upon federal court precedents that established "a basic principle of preclusion doctrine. . . that a
decision in one judicial proceeding cannot bar a subsequent suit raising issues that were not rele-
vant to the first decision." Id. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ing the effect of state judgments." 83 Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent-
ers considered previous Supreme Court decisions that had recognized
exceptions to section 1738 and had subordinated state preclusion rules to con-
flicting state and federal interests. Justice White, however, did refer to several
decisions that had construed section 1738 to support his linking of the full-
and-fair-opportunity exception to the due process clause.8 4 Several of the de-
cisions cited contradict the strict, state-law-governs reading of section 1738
that he presented. 85
Kremer appeared to establish a rigid rule that state law governs in state-
federal litigation under Title VII. It also appeared to hold that both state
claim and issue preclusion doctrines are applicable in such actions by virtue of
section 1738.86 Subsequently, however, lower federal courts were divided over
Kremer's application to section 1983 actions. Several courts of appeals treated
the Kremer reading of section 1738 as controlling in section 1983 litigation; in
other circuits, however, Kremer was not considered dispositive of the issues
left open in Allen.
8 7
C. Haring v. Prosise
The Supreme Court's decision in Haring v. Prosise88 appears to have set-
83. Id at 481-82.
84. See id. at 482-83 & nn.23-24.
85. Justice White referred to M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839), which per-
mitted relitigation when common-law jurisdictional requirements were not satisfied in the prior
proceeding, id. at 329; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), which allowed a state to deny
full faith and credit to a sister state's divorce decree, id at 573-75; and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), which applied preclusion in successive workers' compensation cases
but acknowledged the existence of nonconstitutional public policy exceptions to the strict mandate
of § 1738, id. at 438. These and other decisions construing § 1738 are discussed infra notes 124-
242 and accompanying text.
86. The majority opinion did not specifically apply claim preclusion, indicating that either
claim or issue preclusion might be applicable. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481 n.22. The Court's state-
ment of its holding, however, explicitly did conclude that application of res judicata as well as
collateral estoppel would be compatible with Title VII in cases like Kremer. Id. at 485.
87. Decisions by various courts of appeals after Kremer and prior to Haring demonstrated
that uncertainty existed after Allen on at least two points: whether claim preclusion applied to
§ 1983 actions, and whether § 1738, with its state-law directive, was the source of preclusion doc-
trine in state-federal litigation of§ 1983 claims. See Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 16-17 (lst Cir.
1983) (claim preclusion applies to § 1983 actions; the court examined state law as § 1738 requires,
and also considered general rules of preclusion as outlined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1983) (court expressed distaste for
a "traditional Draconian formulation of rules of res judicata" (quoting Winters v. Lavine, 574
F.2d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1978)), despite Alleds "suggestion that the principles of res judicata may be
applicable to § 1983 actions"); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1983)
(claim preclusion held to apply to § 1983 actions; state law of preclusion must apply under
§ 1738); Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 198-99 (7th Cir. 1982) (claim preclusion applied in
§ 1983 action); Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1982) (claim preclusion not always
mandatory; certain § 1983 claims may not be barred by res judicata, § 1738 not mentioned by
court); Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981) (collateral estoppel and res judicata may
operate to deprive § 1983 plaintiff of choice of forum, but court emphasized importance of choice
of forum, concluding that application of preclusion turns on more than a full and fair opportunity
to litigate; court referred explicitly to Allen and its command that § 1738 operates in the context of
§ 1983, but noted that Allen reserved the question of how § 1738 operates, id at 1137-38 (citing
Allen, 449 U.S. at 105 n.25)), affj' 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
88. 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
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tled several of the ambiguities in Allen and Kremer in its application of issue
preclusion analysis to a section 1983 action raising fourth amendment claims.
Haring confirmed that section 1738 and state preclusion rules are the starting
point for analysis in section 1983 actions as well as in Title VII suits. At the
same time, Justice Marshall's opinion for a unanimous Court indicated that
section 1738 will not be construed as strictly in a section 1983 context.
In Haring, plaintiff Prosise sought damages against police officers who
allegedly had violated his fourth amendment rights when they searched his
apartment. Prosise was charged in state court with possession and manufac-
ture of a controlled substance after the search led to discovery of drugs and
related materials. In a plea agreement Prosise admitted guilt to the crime of
manufacturing the drug and the prosecution dropped the possession charge.
At a hearing concerning the guilty plea, one of the officers testified to the
search and seizure of the incriminating evidence in Prosise's apartment. The
state judge accepted Prosise's guilty plea, finding that it had been entered vol-
untarily and intelligently and that it had a sufficient basis in fact. 89
The question before the Supreme Court was whether Prosise's guilty plea
in state court precluded his section 1983 claim based on the alleged police
violation of his fourth amendment rights. A unanimous Court concluded that
the state proceedings had no such preclusive consequences. The opinion's first
point of analysis was the same as in Kremer-that by virtue of section 1738
federal courts generally should give preclusive effect to state court judgments
whenever the issuing court would do so: "The threshold question is whether,
under the rules of collateral estoppel applied by the Virginia courts, the judg-
ment of conviction based upon Prosise's guilty plea would foreclose him in a
later civil action from challenging the legality of a search which had produced
inculpatory evidence." 90 Justice Marshall recognized that in situations in
which state law was uncertain the federal courts could look for guidance to
preclusion doctrine "as it is generally applied in other jurisdictions." Justice
Marshall found it unnecessary to do so in Haring because Virginia law would
not preclude Prosise's action.91 Because the issue of the legality of the search
had not been litigated or determined in the state proceeding and because the
issues regarding Prosise's guilt, which had been determined, were not relevant
to his right to compensation under section 1983, issue preclusion was inappli-
cable under Virginia doctrine. Claim preclusion was not at issue in Haring
because the federal plaintiff could not have raised a claim for compensation
against the police officers as part of the state criminal prosecution.92
Defendant police officers argued that even if Virginia law would not pre-
clude the section 1983 claim, a more restrictive rule of preclusion should be
applied to deter federal court litigation of fourth amendment claims by state
prisoners. They contended that a more preclusive rule would be consistent
89. Id at 2370.
90. Id. at 2373.
91. Id at 2374.
92. Id
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with Supreme Court habeas corpus decisions that deny federal court consider-
ation of fourth amendment issues in the review of a state court conviction
based on a guilty plea. In defendants' view, the state criminal proceeding pro-
vided a full and fair opportunity for Prosise to litigate the fourth amendment
issue; therefore, his failure to do so should be treated as a waiver of his
claim.
93
The Court rejected these arguments advocating a more preclusive federal
rule by distinguishing the purposes and elements of habeas corpus, in which a
waiver rule has been applied, from section 1983 compensation claims.
9 4 Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that a more preclusive rule "would threaten impor-
tant interests in preserving federal courts as an available forum for the
vindication of constitutional rights." 95 Thus, defendants' proposal was an ob-
jectionable effort to compel litigation of constitutional claims in state, rather
than federal, court. The rule suggested by defendants "would be wholly con-
trary to one of the central concerns which motivated the enactment of [section]
1983, namely, the 'grave Congressional concern that the state courts had been
deficient in protecting federal rights.' "96
The Haring opinion clarified both Allen and Kremer.97 Justice Marshall's
opinion in Haring, consistent with Kremer, confirmed that section 1738 and
state issue preclusion doctrines govern section 1983 cases. The opinion, how-
ever, looks to state law as the starting point and not as the sole determinant of
the claim and issue preclusion effects of a state court judgment in section 1738
analysis. The Court held that state law "generally" will govern, and that the
"threshold" inquiry should be into the Virginia rules of preclusion.98 This
qualifying language implies that state preclusion rules will not be dispositive
in all cases.
In contrast to Kremer, but consistent with Allen, Haring recognized the
applicability of a federal exception to state rules of preclusion in addition to
the full-and-fair-opportunity standard. The Court stated that "additional ex-
ceptions to collateral estoppel may be warranted in section 1983 actions in
light of the 'understanding of [section] 1983' that 'the federal courts could step
in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.' 99
This exception to a strict preclusion rule based on the "understanding of
[section] 1983" and later references in Justice Marshall's opinion to "preserv-
93. Id at 2376.
94. Id. at 2376-78.
95. Id. at 2378.
96. Id (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99).
97. Haringis a significant case both for the clarifications of Allen discussed in this Article and
because a unanimous Court permitted litigation in federal court. The Court rejected a comity-
based argument that would have restricted plaintiffs to state court adjudication of federal constitu-
tional rights. This decision and Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982), run counter to
the Burger Court's trend of restricting access to a federal forum. Haring's careful application of
state issue preclusion principles signals disagreement with the lower court decisions that applied
Allen as a sweeping, comity-based doctrine for clearing dockets of prisoner suits.
98. Haring, 103 S. Ct. at 2373.
99. Id (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 101).
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ing federal courts as an available forum for the vindication of constitutional
rights" 10" resurrect the legislative purpose of section 1983 as a factor in issue
preclusion analysis. Although Allen rejected the access-to-federal-court pur-
pose of section 1983 as justification for a per se rule that section 1738 does not
apply, Haring suggests that the understanding of section 1983 regarding choice
of forum in some cases may justify an exception to state rules of preclusion."1'
Although Haring states that federal courts may deviate from state rules of
preclusion to apply federal principles that would allow litigation, the Court
did not explain the logical or doctrinal basis for this reading of section 1738
and did not develop the nature and scope of such special federal rules. Be-
cause Virginia's issue preclusion doctrine would not bar Prosise's suit, the
court did not have to consider the content of, or justification for, an under-
standing-of-section-1983 exception to state law.
D. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education
Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education,1 2 the Court's
most recent preclusion decision in this sequence, did not address directly the
exceptions to preclusion mentioned in Haring.t°3 Migra settled the question
reserved in Allen regarding the application of claim preclusion in section 1983
actions, however, and confirmed the role of section 1738 and state law in state-
federal preclusion analysis.
100. Id at 2378.
101. The second part of the Haringdecision, which rejected defendants' waiver argument, also
undercuts the notion that § 1738 demands simple fidelity to state law. Justice Marshall rejected
defendants' argument that federal interests in comity and judicial economy justified preclusion
even if Virginia law would not bar this action. Id at 2375-76. If§ 1738 is read literally-a federal
court must give state proceedings "the same full faith and credit" as a state court--the Court could
have rejected defendants' argument for a federal rule with greaterpreclusive effect on that narrow
reading. Instead, the parties and the Court assumed that a federal court, consistent with § 1738,
could apply a more preclusive standard for the federal court system if it were justified on a policy
basis. The Court stated, however, that if "state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior
judgment, 'the courts of the United States can accord it no greater efficacy."' Id at 2373 n.6
(quoting Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903)), Cf. Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine of
Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903) was well settled and had been applied
correctly, but was "unfortunate").
102. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
103. Subsequent to Migr4 the Supreme Court considered the application of preclusion to a
§ 1983 action in federal court following an arbitration proceeding. McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984). That decision did not implicate § 1738 and thus did not address
directly the questions considered in this Article. Because arbitration proceedings are not 'judicial
proceedings" to which § 1738 requires full faith and credit, the Court held that § 1738 did not
govern the preclusion analysis. Id. at 1801-02. In the absence of a statutory mandate, the Court
did not employ the implied repeal analysis of Allen and Kremer, see supra text accompanying
notes 41-43, 68-69, but treated the issue as whether federal common-law preclusion doctrines
should extend to arbitration awards. Id at 1802.
A unanimous Court concluded that arbitration rulings should not be given claim and issue
preclusion consequences because to do so would violate § 1983's legislative purpose-to create
judicially enforceable rights. An arbitration proceeding was determined to be an inadequate sub-
stitute for federal trial because the expertise and athority of an arbitrator is restricted to thecontract and to the "law of the shop": the union, rather than the individual, usually has exclusive
control over presentation of the arbitration grievance and arbitral fact-finding and procedures arelimited in comparison to judicial fact-finding and proce ures. Id at 1803-04.
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Plaintiff in Migra, a supervisor of elementary education, had her employ-
ment terminated by the Warren (Ohio) City School District Board of Educa-
tionY°4 She initially brought suit in state court, alleging state-law claims of
breach of contract by the Board and wrongful interference by individual
Board members with her contract of employment.10 5 The state judge found
for plaintiff on the contract claim after a bench trial and ordered that she be
reinstated with back pay. The court reserved and continued the claim regard-
ing the individual members' liability, which was later dismissed without
prejudice at plaintiff's request.
106
Plaintiff subsequently filed an action in federal court under sections 1983
and 1985107 in which she alleged a conspiracy to violate her first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendment rights.108 Plaintiff claimed that in the course of her
employment she had advocated curriculum changes and the implementation
of a voluntary desegregation plan. Plaintiff charged that board members had
terminated her employment as punishment for her exercise of free speech and
advocacy of desegregation, and that they had falsely and maliciously at-
tempted to smear her reputation and deprive her of continued employment
without due process. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and compensatory and
punitive damages.10 9
The district court granted the school board summary judgment on claim
preclusion grounds, reasoning that plaintiff could have raised her civil rights
claims in the state proceeding. The court concluded that section 1983 actions
were subject to claim preclusion, as well as to issue preclusion, on the basis of
decisions that had been handed down by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit prior to Allen." 0 The district court did not refer to sec-
tion 1738 or to Ohio rules of preclusion, but instead relied on federal common-
law precedent for its decision that claim preclusion barred separation of plain-
tiff's state and federal claims into two suits."' The court of appeals affirmed
in a brief opinion. 12  It
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Migra and the school board conceded
that section 1738 and Ohio rules of preclusion should govern." 3 Their disa-
104. Dr. Migra was employed under written, annual contracts for successive school years from
1976 to 1979. She initially was offered renewal of her contract for the 1979-1980 school year, she
accepted the appointment by letter. The Board subsequently voted not to renew her employment
and she never received a written contract for 1979-1980. Id at 894-95.
105. Plaintiff's state court complaint was in five counts, including allegations that the board's
second meeting, at which the offer of renewal was revoked, was without legal effect because it did
not comply with the Ohio procedural requirements for special board meetings. Id.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1982).
108. 104 S. Ct. at 895.
109. Id
110. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. C80-1183-Y slip op. (N.D. Ohio
1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1983), afpa 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
111. Id. at 4-5.
112. Migra, 703 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1983), affa 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
113. At oral argument "both counsel took the position that Ohio's version of res judicata gov-
ems." 199 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 13, 1983).
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greement centered on the application of Ohio preclusion principles to Migra's
second suit-whether the second suit raised sufficiently distinct claims to be a
different "cause of action" from that adjudicated by the state court and
whether the severence and reservation of plaintiff's tort claim by the state trial
judge prevented the merger of related tort claims with the judgment on the
contract claim. 114 Briefs of amici curiae urged the Court to take a different
approach-to establish a rule of "qualified preclusion" in section 1983 cases
that would apply issue preclusion to matters actually litigated and determined
by a state court, but that would not preclude federal claims that were withheld
in the state proceeding. The amicibriefs argued that the legislative purpose of
section 1983-to provide a federal forum for federal claims-was inconsistent
with the application of claim preclusion to matters not actually litigated in a
prior state action. 15
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the primacy of section 1738 and
state law in the application of claim preclusion to section 1983 actions. Draw-
ing heavily on A/1en's construction of sections 1738 and 1983, the Court re-
jected the amici curiae's argument that the claim preclusion consequences of a
state judgment should be analyzed differently from issue preclusion. The
Court found it "difficult to see" any policy concerns underlying section 1983
that would justify differing treatment of claim and issue preclusion and con-
cluded that the argument for an implied repeal of section 1738 by section 1983
in this claim preclusion context was indistinguishable from that rejected in
Allen." 6 Thus, the Court held that the prior judgment should have the same
claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the
Ohio state courts. The action was remanded to the district court for interpre-
tation and application of Ohio law.
117
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, wrote a
concurring opinion that addressed the possibility that a federal court might
preclude the litigation on the basis of federal claim preclusion principles even
if the Ohio courts would not. Justice White expressed support for a reading of
section 1738 that would allow federal courts to apply more strict preclusion
principles than state courts because a refusal to devote federal court resources
to the litigation still would leave the parties free to litigate in state court. He
concluded, however, that previous decisions of the Supreme Court had estab-
lished a construction of section 1738 that set state preclusion law as a "ceiling"
114. Brief of Petitioner at 14-23; Brief of Respondent at 7-22.
115. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Greater Cleveland Chapter of the
A.C.L.U. at 38-62; Brief for the National Education Association at 2-10. Respondent's Brief
answered the amici's arguments for an exception to § 1738 at 22-31, as well as plaintiff's interpre-
tation of Ohio preclusion doctrine, at 7-22. Professor Shapiro has developed justifications for
treating claim preclusion differently from issue preclusion in an article written prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Migra. Shapiro, TheApplication of State Claim Preclusion Rules in a
Federal Civil JAzghts Action, 10 Oulo N.U.L. REv. 223, 230-35 (1983).
116. Mira, 104 S. Ct. at 897-98.
117. The Supreme Court concluded that Ohio preclusion doctrine was evolving; the Court was
uncertain how the doctrine would apply to Migra's second suit. Id at 899. Because the lower
courts had not applied Ohio case law, it was appropriate for the Court to remand for considera-
tion of this issue. Id.
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as well as a "floor" for purposes of full faith and credit. Because this interpre-
tation of section 1738 was long standing and had been left undisturbed by
Congress, Justice White felt compelled to acquiesce in the Court's reliance on
Ohio law, despite his desire to permit more federal control over court
dockets. 18
The Migra decision stands as the analogue to Allen; it established the
applicability of claim preclusion to section 1983 actions. The Migra opinion,
however, could be read to go even further in its apparent reliance on a literal
interpretation of section 1738. The Court's opinion presents Allen and Kremer
as adopting a state-law-governs reading of section 1738; Migra contains
neither Haring's hedge words nor references to Haring's summary of preclu-
sion analysis, which treated state law as only the starting point and included
exceptions based on the full-and-fair-opportunity standard and the under-
standing of section 1983. The Haring opinion is referred to only in the most
general way.119 The Court's choice of language and the apparent absoluteness
of the proposition that Ohio law must govern can be read to suggest that the
strict Kremer reading of section 1738 also should be applied to section 1983
actions.
There are several reasons to doubt that Justice Blackmun's majority opin-
ion in Migra intended to foreclose the possibility of case-by-case exceptions to
preclusion as suggested in Haring and as proposed by this Article. The Migra
decision must be interpreted in light of both the lower court opinions reviewed
by the Court and the parties' arguments presented to the Court. The district
court decision, rendered after Allen but before Kremer and Haring, had relied
upon the principles of preclusion established in federal case law, rather than
section 1738 or Ohio law. Given the benefit of the Kremer and Haring deci-
sions, the parties on appeal to the Supreme Court accepted that section 1738
and Ohio law would govern. They did not assert that either of Haring's ex-
ceptions to the application of state law were relevant. The amic however,
urged adoption of a blanket exception to claim preclusion based on the alleged
inconsistency between the purpose of section 1983 and the preclusion of claims
not reached by a state court.
The Court's opinion, therefore, is a clear rejection of the lower court's
application of federal preclusion doctrine and of the amicis efforts to distin-
guish claim preclusion from issue preclusion in section 1738 analysis. The
applicability of section 1738 in claim preclusion analysis, however, does not
determine whether there may be case-by-case exceptions to the application of
state law under section 1738. Migrds reliance on the reasoning and statutory
interpretation in Allen is instructive. Alleds rejection of an implied repeal ar-
gument and recognition that section 1738 governs in issue preclusion analysis
left open the possibility of some exceptions to preclusion.120 The full-and-fair-
118. Id at 899-900 (White, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 896. Haring is cited only after quotations from Allen and Kremer regarding con-
struction of § 1738.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
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opportunity test explicated in Kremer and the understanding-of-section-1983
exception presented in Haring are consistent with Allen's conclusion that sec-
tion 1738 governs in section 1983 actions. The Migra decision equates the
analysis of claim preclusion and issue preclusion under section 1738; presuma-
bly, Migra would have recognized similar exceptions to the application of state
law if that had been necessary to the outcome of the appeal.
The applicability of the exceptions to preclusion was not raised by any of
the parties to Migra and was not considered by the Court. In addition, Migra
presented a particularly unsympathetic case to escape the application of state
preclusion law. Plaintiff had freely exercised a choice of forum. As Justice
Blackmun noted, plaintiff could have brought her state claims along with her
federal claims in a federal court action under pendent jurisdiction. Plaintiff
thereby would have been assured a federal forum for her federal claim even if
the federal court had declined to hear her state-law claim. 121 Justice Black-
mun distinguished Migra from Allen, in which he dissented, on the basis of
plaintiff's exercise of this choice of forum. Thus, plaintiff already had rejected
the federal forum that section 1983 was designed to provide.'
22
The Supreme Court need not have addressed a choice of forum argument,
even if it had been available to plaintiff. Haring established section 1738 and
state law as the starting point for preclusion analysis. Thus, the Court should
consider the full-and-fair-opportunity test and the understanding-of-section-
1983 exception only if state law would preclude the action. The Supreme
Court had no reason to discuss possible exceptions to preclusion because it
had declined to decide the preclusion issue under Ohio law. The Court's fail-
ure to discuss the full-and-fair-opportunity test should not be interpreted as an
implicit rejection of that well-established and constitutionally mandated ex-
ception to state preclusion law. This exception was not mentioned by the
Court presumably because it was not raised by the parties and did not have to
be addressed to conclude that a remand was required. Similarly, the Court's
silence regarding Haring's understanding-of-section-1983 exception should
not be construed as an implied rejection of case-by-case exceptions to
preclusion.
Finally, the Court's opinion does not require a literal reading of section
1738 because such a reading is contrary to the Court's application of section
1738 in other areas. Allen, Kremer, Haring, and Migra did not discuss the
construction of section 1738 in divorce, workers' compensation, or bankruptcy
cases. In these areas the preclusion principles of the rendering state have
yielded to conflicting state and federal interests.123 Kremer's and Migra's
description of section 1738 as a strict mandate to apply the issuing state's law
121. If a federal court abstained under Pullman, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941), plaintiff could withhold her federal claim from the state proceeding in an England
reservation, England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), and liti-
gate the federal claim in federal court at the conclusion of the state action. See Migra, 104 S. Ct. at
898 n.7.
122. Id.
123. See infa text accompanying notes 156-243.
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is contrary to a substantial body of precedent. Therefore, the Court's opinion
should not be interpreted as an implied rejection of similar flexibility in the
application of section 1738 to civil rights cases in which the party precluded
has not had a chance to exercise the choice of forum that sections 1983 and
1343 were intended to guarantee.
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND 28 U.S.C. § 1738
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution 24 and its implement-
ing statute, section 1738,125 commonly are applied to require the application
of the preclusion rules of the state that rendered the prior judgment. It is
striking, however, in light of the specific language of the statute and the fre-
quency with which courts cite a state-law-governs reading of it, how infre-
quently section 1738 is mentioned in cases in which it would be applicable,
particularly state-federal litigation, and how often federal principles rather
than state law actually are determinative of preclusion.
The courts may not have referred to section 1738 and state preclusion
rules in state-federal litigation because historically federal and state preclusion
principles have not differed significantly. Reliance on federal case law in
many of these instances, therefore, may not signal disagreement with a state-
law-governs reading of section 1738 or with state doctrine. Rather, the federal
court may have relied on federal precedent with which it was more familiar or
that was more developed on the particular subject, on the assumption that
state case law would be comparable. 126 The Supreme Court, however, has
acted contrary to state preclusion rules in many instances, sometimes without
referring to preclusion doctrine,127 often without referring to section 1738,128
and occasionally by recognizing an exception to section 1738129 to accommo-
124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (for text see supra note 7).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (for text see supra note 8).
126. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), is an example of a decision in state-
federal litigation that "innocently" relied on federal preclusion doctrine rather than state law. The
preclusion question was one of privity between the public contractor, who was the plaintiff in the
state action, and the United States, plaintiff in the federal suit. The Supreme Court concluded
that privity existed and barred the second suit based on federal precedent because the United
States financed and directed the state litigation. Id. at 153-55. The opinion did not mention
§ 1738 or Montana law, but the conclusion about privity appears to be consistent with Montana
preclusion doctrine. It is not appropriate to read the Court's reliance on federal case law as a
rejection of either § 1738 or state law because there was no split of authority between the federal
courts and Montana over the privity issue.
127. See, e. g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964)
(plaintiffs permitted to relitigate constitutional claim in federal court because of reasonable belief
that federal law required them to raise constitutional issues at state level).
128. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (bankruptcy court not confined by prior
state court judgment when reviewing dischargeability of debt); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medi-
cal Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (plaintiffs did not intend to litigate unreservedly constitutional
claim in state court and could relitigate claim in federal court); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433
(1940) (Bankruptcy Act deprived state court of jurisdiction to decide on mortgage foreclosure
prior to decision by bankruptcy court).
129. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (successive workers'
compensation awards as an exception to full faith and credit); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945) (second state may treat exparte divorce as nullity if plaintiff did not establish
good faith domicile in state of prior action); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174
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date other national interests or well-established doctrines that conflicted with
full faith and credit.
The concept of full faith and credit that emerges from this review of
Supreme Court decisions is not unitary. It reflects different accommodations
made by the Court between full faith and credit and other state and federal
interests. The Court has not developed a consistent doctrine of exceptions, but
has operated largely on an ad hoc basis because of the lack of textual support
for exceptions to section 1738 and disagreement over the exceptions' scope and
justification.
These exceptions, however, refute the inflexible reading of section 1738
presented in Kremer and Migra. Prior to Kremer it was recognized that full
faith and credit "is not an inexorable and unqualified command."' 30 The jus-
tification for exceptional treatment of section 1983 cases under section 1738
can and should be made on a policy level; substantial precedential support
exists for deviation from the literal language of section 1738 for reasons that
are comparable to the stated purposes of section 1983.
A. Enactment and Earliest Interpretation'
3'
The first Supreme Court decisions construing section 1738 frequently are
cited for the proposition that a federal court may not employ its own rules of
preclusion to determine the effect of state judgments. t32 Mills v. Duryee
133
and Hampton v. McConnel' 34 applied state law to bar a second action in fed-
eral court; neither case, however, involved a conflict between state and federal
interests that might have led the Court to question a literal application of sec-
tion 1738. Mills and Hampton did not decide between the application of state
or federal preclusion law; in the early nineteenth century there was no sense
that the common-law preclusion doctrines might develop independently in
state and federal courts.
The question addressed in Mills and Hampton was whether an earlier
state judgment had to be given conclusive effect in federal court or should be
(1850) (lack ofjurisdiction over defendant in prior proceeding permits second court to reconsider
issues).
130. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
131. For the history of full faith and credit, see generally Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause ofthe Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); Nadelman, Full Faith and Credit
to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1957); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949); Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination ofthe Full Falth
and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pt. 1), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981).
132. In KremerJustice White referred to Mills v. Duryee, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813),
to support his strict interpretation of § 1738:
It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ their
own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes
beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the
State from which the judgment is taken.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82.
133. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
134. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818).
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treated merely as prima facie evidence of the winning party's claim. It was
unclear how much credit a second court had to give to a judgment of another
court because the language and legislative history of the constitutional clause
and section 1738 were ambiguous.
"Faith" and "credit" were evidentiary terms used at common law to de-
scribe the effect given to judgments from a foreign jurisdiction. The recogni-
tion of such judgments was a matter of comity, a respect for courts of another
sovereign.' 35 Sister colony judgments in the American colonies prior to the
Articles of Confederation were treated as foreign judgments under interna-
tional law principles-they generally were admissible as prima facie evidence
of a claim or defense, but were not accorded the conclusive effect that was
given a judgment within the same colony.
136
The Articles of Confederation contained a full faith and credit clause sim-
ilar to the one that later was ratified in the Constitution.137 There are no
records of debates or committee reports that explain the purpose of the clause.
Court decisions interpreting the Articles of Confederation were divided over
whether the requirement of "full" faith and credit meant to alter the common-
law treatment of sister colony judgments.' 38
Efforts to specify that conclusive effect must be given a sister state judg-
ment were defeated at the Constitutional Convention.' 39 A compromise was
reached whereby the ambiguous full faith and credit language of the Articles
of Confederation was retained and authority was delegated to Congress to pre-
scribe how prior judgments were to be proven and what effect they should
have: 140 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."'
14 1
In 1790 the first Congress exercised this authority and enacted the prede-
cessor to section 1738.142 The statute went further than the constitutional
clause; it applied to "every court within the United States," and therefore cov-
ered federal as well as state courts. It also provided for authentication ofjudg-
ments through the attestation of records of judicial proceedings. It still used
the ambiguous evidentiary terms "faith" and "credit," however, to describe
135. Nadelman, supra note 131, at 48-53; Whitten, supra note 131, at 555-559.
136. Nadelman, supra note 131, at 48-53; Whitten, supra note 131, at 555-559.
137. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given
in each of these states to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of
every other State."
138. Nadelman, supra note 131, at 49-53; Whitten, supra note 131, at 535-542.
139. Jackson, supra note 131, at 3-7; Nadelman, supra note 131, at 55-59.
140. Whitten, supra note 131, at 550-52.
141. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § I.
142. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. For all purposes relevant to this Article, the
statute remains unchanged. A 1948 amendment that was not intended to alter the statute's mean-
ing amended the phrase "such faith and credit" to the present "same full faith and credit." Act of
June 25, 1948, § 1738, 62 Stat. 942. See Nadelman, supra note 131, at 81-82.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the effect to be given such authenticated records. 143
Lower federal courts prior to the 1813 Mills decision disagreed whether
conclusive or prima facie effect was appropriate under the statute."44 In Mills,
defendant in a federal court debt collection action attempted to relitigate the
issue of his liability, which had been determined by a New York state court.
Justice Story resolved the debate between conclusive and prima facie effect,
ruling that New York law should govern by virtue of the predecessor to sec-
tion 1738.145 Because a New York court would not reconsider defendant's
liability on the debt, the federal court should preclude relitigation of this issue
as well.
146
The Mills reading of the predecessor to section 1738 was reaffirmed by
Chief Justice Marshall in Hampton- "The judgment of a state court should
have the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court of the United
States which it had in the state where it was pronounced."'147 The general rule
of Mills and Hampton has become well established; a judgment will have the
same preclusion consequences in a second forum that it would have in the
rendering state.'
48
The Supreme Court has not had the benefit of a legislative history to con-
strue section 1738 because records of debate and committee consideration of
the predecessor to section 1738 apparently were destroyed during the War of
1812.149 The literal reading of the statute adopted in Mills and Hampton is
consistent with what the Court has described as the unifying purpose of the
constitutional clause it was implementing-"to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations cre-
ated under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make
them integral parts of a single nation." 150
No conflict existed in either Mills or Hampton between literal application
of state law pursuant to section 1738 and any interest of the federal court sys-
tem. Exceptions to a strict reading of section 1738 arose because the unifying
purpose of full faith and credit sometimes was at odds with other values of
federalism. The earliest examples of the Court withdrawing from simple ap-
plication of section 1738 occurred when preclusion interfered with the sover-
eignty of a second state over matters that were historically of particularly local
concern. A literal construction of section 1738 in such "state-state" litigation
has yielded to the interest of the forum state in the matrimonial status of its
143. The statute stated that such authenticated records "shall have such faith and credit given
to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122,
144. Whitten, supra note 131, at 559-70.
145. Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 484.
146. Id
147. Hampton4 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 235.
148. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82; Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1941).
149. Nadelman, supra note 131, at 60 n.124.
150. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
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domiciliaries, 15 1 in ownership of property within its boundaries, 152 and in pro-
viding adequate compensation to injured resident workers. 153 More recently,
the Court also has refused preclusive effect to state court judgments in state-
federal litigation in which full faith and credit conflicts with a congressional
scheme of federal remedies and federal court jurisdiction.1
5 4
These examples of full faith and credit yielding in both the state-state and
the state-federal setting are significant to this Article's discussion of state-fed-
eral litigation under section 1983 because the same statutory language in sec-
tion 1738 regarding application of the rendering state's law is at issue. 155
Thus, decisions that allow a degree of flexibility in applying the statute in
state-state cases are relevant in interpreting the statute in a state-federal con-
text. The Court has made similar ad hoe exceptions to the application of the
rendering state's law in both state-state and state-federal litigation.
B. Prior Application of Full Faith and Credit State-State Litigation
1. Jurisdiction
The earliest limitation placed on full faith and credit was the acknowl-
edgement that a second court can inquire into the subject matter and territo-
rial jurisdiction of the prior proceeding.' 5 6 The familiar principle established
in these decisions is that a judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction is
void and can be attacked collaterally in other courts. The significant point is
that the concept of jurisdiction employed in these cases went beyond the do-
mestic rules of jurisdiction of the first forum. If a state court had violated its
own jurisdictional rules, it would not afford the judgment res judicata effect;
therefore consistent with section 1738, no other court would have to defer to it.
151. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); infra text accompanying notes 164-
81.
152. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n.5 (1942). The Court noted:
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386; Hood v. McGehee, 237
U.S. 611... refuse to require courts of one state to allow acts or judgments of another
to control the disposition or devolution of realty in the former; They seem to rest on the
doctrine that the state where the land is located is "sole mistress" of its rules of real
property. See Hood v. McGehee, supra, p. 615; and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Fall v. Eastin, supra, p. 14.
153. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); infra text accompanying
notes 182-206.
154. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (infra text accompanying notes 220-24); England v.
Louisana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (infra text accompanying notes
225-34).
155. The implementing statute is usually the basis for decisions involving the full faith and
credit consequences of a state judgment regardless of whether the second proceeding is in a state
or federal court. The statute is the only source governing federal courts; the constitutional clause
only mandates that state courts defer to sister state judgments. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It has
been debated whether the constitutional clause is self-effectuating-whether in the absence of
§ 1738 a state court would be bound to provide full faith and credit to another state's judgment.
Resolution of that question is not significant in this discussion because the Supreme Court has not
differentiated between the constitutional clause and § 1738 in its rulings on recognition of judg-
ments. The distinction may be important in choice of law questions because, unlike the constitu-
tional clause, the original version of § 1738 did not require deference to the laws of a sister state.
156. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 165 (1850); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
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Rather than relying on this simplistic application of full faith and credit, how-
ever, these early decisions relied on a common-law concept of jurisdiction to
test the authority of the first court to act.
In D'Arcy v. Ketchum157 a New York state court entered judgment against
a nonparticipating defendant on the basis of a New York statute that permit-
ted judgment against all joint debtors if any one of them could be subjected to
service of process. An action was brought against D'Arcy in federal court in
Louisiana to collect on the New York judgment; he defended on the ground
that the judgment should be given no effect because it was entered without
jurisdiction over him. New York law clearly authorized the exercise of juris-
diction over D'Arcy and would have accorded the judgment prima facie evi-
dentiary weight in a subsequent collection action. The Supreme Court,
however, concluded the New York judgment should be given no effect because
it violated a principle of "international law" that required that a defendant be
served with process or appear voluntarily.'
58
Jurisdictional decisions like D'Arcy would be justified today under the
constitutional principle that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment limits the territorial jurisdiction of state courts. A second court need not
give full faith and credit to a judgment entered in violation of the Constitu-
tion. No constitutional restrictions on state court jurisdiction, however, existed
at the time that D'Arcy was handed down. The fourteenth amendment was
not ratified until 1868159 and the due process clause was not recognized as a
limitation on state court jurisdiction until Pennoyer v. NeP'60 in 1878.
How did the Court rationalize this precondition for full faith and credit?
No reference to a jurisdictional limitation on full faith and credit appears in
the statute, the constitutional clause, or the congressional debates prior to rati-
fication. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that these jurisdictional
limitation principles were known at the time of the Constitutional Convention
and that the drafters would have been more explicit if they had intended the
clause and statute to abolish them.
16 1
Thus, the concept of limited jurisdiction was derived from notions of state
sovereignty within a federal system. A state's paramount interest in determin-
ing the legal status of its citizens and the ownership of property within its
boundaries could not be usurped by another state's judicial proceedings. This
157. 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 165 (1850).
158. Id. at 176.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW B-1I (10th ed. 1982).
160. 94 U.S. 714 (1878).
161. SeeD'Arcy, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 186:
Subject to this established principle of personal service of process, Congress also legis-
lated; and the question is, whether it was intended to overthrow this principle, and to
declare a new rule, which would bind the citizens of one state to the laws of another; as
must be the case if the laws of New York bind this defendant in Louisiana. There was
no evil in this part of the existing law, and no remedy called for, and in our opinion
Congress did not intend to overthrow the old rule by the enactment that such faith and
credit should be given to records of judgments as they had in the state where made.
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jurisdictional limitation was the basis for avoiding decrees that adjudicated
ownership of real estate located in another state 162 and that probated the es-
tate of a decedent domiciled in another state.
163
2. Divorce
The Supreme Court's treatment of "migratory" divorce decrees is a good
example of the manipulation of the common-law jurisdiction concept. Al-
though rationalized as a jurisdictional issue, the refusal to give preclusive ef-
fect to another state's divorce decree has been premised on concern that full
faith and credit would interfere with the forum state's right to determine the
matrimonial status of its own domiciliaries. 16
The friction between full faith and credit and state sovereignty over mar-
riage and divorce was greatest when a few states offered relatively simple no-
fault divorces while the majority of states had restrictive requirements.165 For
example, if a spouse established the brief residence required in Nevada for
purposes of its divorce statutes and obtained a divorce decree, would other
states have to give the divorce full recognition? If so, the divorce policies in
the more restrictive states would have been undermined and watered down to
the standards of the more lenient states. If not, on what basis could another
state refuse full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce?
Prior to 1942 the Supreme Court had denied full faith and credit to di-
vorces in which the petitioning party left the marital home and obtained an ex
parte divorce in another state. For the decree to receive extraterritorial effect,
service on the defendant had to be accomplished in the forum state or the
rendering state had to be either the domicile of the defendant or the matrimo-
nial domicile.' 66 Thus, the Court protected the autonomy of the marital dom-
icile state to regulate the grounds and terms of the dissolution of marriage by
denying full faith and credit to decrees based solely on the establishment of
domicile by the plaintiff.
167
The doctrinal basis for avoiding full faith and credit was the in rem168
162. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
163. See Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907).
164. See Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Outline and Possible
Changes, 9 VAND. L. REy. 1, 1-11 (1955); see also Foster & Freed, Modification, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Orders, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 280 (1975) (noting similar reluctance
on the part of nations to yield jurisdiction over their citizens' alimony orders).
165. Sumner, supra note 164, at 2-3.
166. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled, Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
167. See Sumner, supra note 164, at 2.
168. A proceeding in rem is an action that seeks an adjudication regarding the status or own-
ership of a res rather than a determination of personal liability as in an in personam action.
Traditionally, jurisdiction in an in personam action could be obtained when the defendant was
present in the state for service of process or appeared voluntarily. Pennoyer v. Neff, 94 U.S. 714
(1877). Jurisdiction in an in rem action was premised on the presence of the property in the state,
without regard to the presence or absence of the owner of the property. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S.
316 (1890). When the res was intangible property, such as a debt or a legal relationship such as
marriage, jurisdiction depended on the fictional presence of the res in the forum state. Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (a debt is present and subject to garnishment wherever a debtor may go;
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characterization of a divorce proceeding. The marital status of the parties-
the res over which the rendering court must have jurisdiction-did not neces-
sarily travel with the deserting spouse. The marital res remained in the origi-
nal state of domicile; a divorce action could be brought only in that state if the
innocent party remained in the state of marital domicile and could not be
served in another state.169 This domicile requirement-like the jurisdiction
exceptions to full faith and credit-was not derived from the Constitution but
from the common law.170
The Supreme Court's 1942 decision in Williams v. North Carolina (Wil-
liams 1) 17 1 marked a shift in the treatment of full faith and credit that reflected
changing attitudes toward divorce. Although the earlier cases had applied
jurisdictional concepts to protect the sovereignty of states in dictating divorce
policies, Williams Iand later decisions exhibited concern for the rights of indi-
viduals subject to overly restrictive divorce laws. 172 Full faith and credit was
employed increasingly to require deference to sister state divorce decrees.
173
These later cases still conceptualized the marital status as a res, but one that is
present in the state of domicile of either spouse. Once a party established a
good faith domicile in a state other than that of the prior marital home, the
second state had jurisdiction to entertain a divorce action.
Thus, the focus of full faith and credit disputes under the modern ap-
proach is the determination of good faith domicile. Subsequently, in Williams
v. North Carolina (Williams IF), 174 the Court considered the circumstances
under which North Carolina, the state of original marital domicile, must give
full faith and credit to a determination by a Nevada court that a spouse's six-
week stay in that state established domicile. 175 The opinion by Justice Frank-
now limited by the fairness standard imposed by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1976); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903) (the
marriage does not travel with a deserting spouse who establishes residence in another state).
169. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 39 (1903). Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906), demonstrates the manipulability of such a legal fiction. The Court held that the marital res
may travel from the state of marital domicile when it is the "innocent" party who is forced to
move to another state. The Haddock reasoning was repudiated in Williams v, North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287 (1942).
170. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), stated that "since
1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English speaking world has questioned the
domicile requirement for jurisdiction." Id at 229.
171. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
172. Sumner, supra note 164, at 2-3.
173. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951);
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
174. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
175. rIliamslreversed a bigamy conviction in North Carolina on the ground that the North
Carolina court had failed to give full faith and credit to an expare Nevada divorce decree. De-
fendants were North Carolina residents who had traveled to Nevada, stayed in a motel for the
requisite six weeks to establish Nevada residency, and obtained exparte divorces from their re-
spective North Carolina spouses. They married in Nevada immediately after the divorces and
returned to North Carolina to live. Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 289-90. The subsequent marriage of
defendants would not have been considered bigamous in North Carolina if the Nevada decree
had been valid. Subsequent to Williams 1, a retrial occurred in which the issue of defendant's
bona fide domicile in Nevada was submitted to the jury.
On remand, the jury was instructed that the Nevada finding of jurisdiction, made without
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furter exemplified the process of accommodation used by the Court to recon-
cile the conflict between the command of section 1738 and North Carolina's
authority over the marital status of its domiciliaries.
The majority in Williams 11 concluded that North Carolina could refuse
to recognize a Nevada divorce even though it comported with Nevada's juris-
dictional statutes as well as the constitutional requirements of the due process
clause. 176 The precedential support for this ruling was the earlier jurisdiction
cases, but the method of analysis reached an accommodation of the interests of
North Carolina and Nevada.
"The problem is to reconcile the reciprocal respect to be accorded by
the members of the Union to their adjudications with due regard for
another most important aspect of our federalism whereby the "do-
mestic relations of husband and wife . . . were matters reserved to
the states" . . . and do not belong to the United States."
177
North Carolina could apply its own policies regarding divorce and remarriage
rather than defer to those of Nevada as long as defendants continued to be
domiciled in North Carolina. The Court refused to apply the literal command
of section 1738 because "the policy of each State in matters of most intimate
concern could be subverted by the policy of every other State."' 173 The fact
that Nevada's policies were embodied in the form of a judgment of divorce did
not dictate acquiescence by the North Carolina courts.
Williams Ilposed a dilemma because both states asserted a domicile rela-
tionship with defendants. The Nevada decree made an exparte finding that
plaintiffs in the divorce actions were domiciled in Nevada. On the other hand,
in the subsequent bigamy prosecution a North Carolina jury found that de-
fendants remained domiciliaries of North Carolina because they never in-
tended to remain in Nevada beyond the waiting period for a divorce. Justice
Frankfurter concluded that a North Carolina court could reexamine the Ne-
vada finding of domicile because it was a "jurisdictional fact" subject to re-
view by the second forum, but North Carolina must treat the Nevada finding
of domicile as prima facie evidence in the second proceeding. 179 Justice
Frankfurter's balancing of interests, without reference to the early debates re-
garding section 1738, effectively afforded evidentiary weight, but not conclu-
sive effect, to the Nevada judgment on the domicile issue.
When a second court determines that the first forum lacked jurisdiction,
appearance or contest by defendants, was prima facie but not conclusive evidence of defendants'
domicile in Nevada. In this second proceeding, the jury determined that defendants had not es-
tablished bona fide domicile in Nevada and, therefore, that the Nevada decree was not valid
because it was entered without jurisdiction. The jury returned a guilty finding on the charge of
bigamous cohabitation in North Carolina. Defendants unsuccessfully appealed their conviction
through the North Carolina courts and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 322 U.S. 725 (1943).
176. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 239.
177. Id at 232-33 (quoting Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930)); see also In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)).
178. Wlliams I1, 325 U.S at 231.
179. Id at 232, 235-36.
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as the lower court did in Williams II, that determination creates the possibility
of conflicting judgments in the two actions. The second court may ignore the
first judgment completely and need not give the prior proceeding any claim or
issue preclusion effect. The first court, however, may stand by its ruling and
may give effect to it within that court's territorial boundaries if it meets due
process standards. 180
The application of the jurisdiction exception to section 1738 and the pos-
sibility of such inconsistent rulings is limited by the principle of issue preclu-
sion accorded to contested determinations of subject matter and territorial
jurisdiction made by the first court. In Williams I the North Carolina court
was required to give prima facie, but not conclusive, effect to the Nevada
court's finding of Nevada domicile because the North Carolina spouses did
not participate in the Nevada proceedings. Whenever the issue of jurisdiction
actually is litigated and determined in the first proceeding, it is given conclu-
sive effect in any collateral attack.
181
3. Workers' Compensation 182
The Supreme Court's treatment of workers' compensation awards reflects
a similar deference to the interest of a second state to adequately compensate
resident workers who are injured in the course of employment. The Court,
however, has been unable to develop a satisfactory conceptual basis--such as
jurisdiction--to justify these workers' compensation decisions that stand as
further exceptions to full faith and credit.
In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,1 8 3 a case decided six months
prior to 41len, the Supreme Court upheld an award of supplemental benefits
under a workers' compensation scheme in an action that would have been
precluded by a literal application of section 1738. The possibility of supple-
mental benefits arises because more than one state may have jurisdiction to
award benefits. Plaintiff Thomas resided in the District of Columbia and was
180. The Court recognized in Williams I that a Nevada court could determine that Williams
was domiciled in Nevada and the Nevada divorce decree would be valid within that state. Id. at
232. At the same time, a North Carolina court could decide that Williams remained a North
Carolina resident and could be considered still married for purposes of the bigamy prosecution in
that state. The Court concluded that North Carolina's interest in determining the marital status of
its domiciliaries was sufficiently important to permit conflicting judgments despite this inconsis-
tency in the face of the unifying purpose of the full faith and credit clause and statute. Id at 231-
32; id at 241-42 (Murphy, J., concurring).
181. The Court in Williams II reserved the question of the effect of a finding of domicile
"squarely litigated in a truly adversary proceeding." Id at 230 n.6. Subsequent decisions have
applied issue preclusion to contested determinations of domicile and have not permitted a second
forum to relitigate the jurisdiction issue. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1940).
182. For a discussion of workers' compensation as it relates to preclusion and full faith and
credit, see generally Cheatham, Res Audicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. RE. 330 (1944); Reese & Johnson, supra note 129, at 158-
60; Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or Lessto Judgments: Doubts ,bout Thomas v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 69 GEo. L.J. 1329 (1981); Wolkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-
Commonplace or_4nomal in FullFaith and Credit Pattern, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1944); Note, The
Scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Successive Worker's Compensation 4wards, Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 479 (1982).
183. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
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hired there by his employer. He worked in both the District of Columbia and
in Virginia, and his injury occurred while on a job in Virginia. The compensa-
tion boards in both jurisdictions had jurisdiction to award benefits because of
his connections with Virginia and the District of Columbia.1
8 4
Plaintiff initially obtained a compensation award in Virginia by virtue of
an agreement with his employer. That award was conclusive under Virginia
law as to any claims that he had against the employer arising out of the same
accident. Plaintiff filed for a supplemental award in the District of Columbia
when he became aware that the statutory benefits there were higher that those
in Virginia. A lower federal court denied the claim for supplemental benefits
on the basis of full faith and credit.185 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that successive workers' compensation proceedings are an exception to section
1738's mandate to apply Virginia law. No majority ofjustices, however, could
join in a single opinion that reconciled this exceptional treatment with the
language of section 1738.186
The justices were divided both in their reading of section 1738 and in
their views of two prior decisions that originally had established the peculiar
relaxation of full faith and credit in workers' compensation cases. In Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,'87 a five-to-four decision, the Court had ruled that sec-
tion 1738 and Texas res judicata principles precluded Louisiana from granting
benefits under its compensation scheme to supplement awards made in
Texas. 188 The Magnolia decision was undermined significantly, but not over-
ruled, four years later in Industrial Commission v. McCartin.18 9 In McCartin a
unanimous Court permitted an employee to recover a supplemental award in
184. Id at 279.
185. An Administrative Law Judge and a Review Board of the United States Department of
Labor found Thomas eligible for supplemental benefits. 9 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) 760 (1978).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Thomas, 598 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1978), rey"d, 448 U.S. 261 (1980), relying on Pettus v. American
Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 627, 630 (4th Cir. 1978). Pettus had barred recovery under similar facts
because of full faith and credit. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 264-66.
186. The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Black-
mun, concluded that a supplemental award was permissible because the interest the District of
Columbia had to provide additional benefits outweighed the interest Virginia had to limit recov-
ery to the original Virginia award. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 263-86. Three justices (White, Powell,
and Burger) concurred in the result on the basis of stare decisis and the Court's opinion permitting
a supplemental award in Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). The
concurring justices, however, did not accept the plurality's approach of balancing the respective
interests of the two forums. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 286-90 (White, J., concurring). Justices Rehn-
quist and Marshall dissented on a strict reading of full faith and credit in workers' compensation
cases as presented in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Thomas, 448 U.S. at
290-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
187. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
188. The majority concluded that this was compelled by the Texas provision of law that a
recovery of workers' compensation for an injury precludes another claim against the employer
arising out of the same injury. Id at 435-36. The Magnolia opinion recognized that the state-law-
governs command of the constitutional clause and § 1738 may not be "all-embracing, and that
there may be exceptional cases in which the judgment of one state may not override the laws and
policies of another .... ' Id. at 438. The majority, however, concluded that compensation
awards, just as money damages in civil suits, generally do not raise any such policy problems,
particularly when the claimant had the initial choice between the state forums. Id. at 444.
189. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
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Wisconsin after a settlement with his employer under Illinois law. The Court
concluded that a compensation award must be given full faith and credit by
another state only when the rendering state's workers' compensation scheme
includes "some unmistakable language by a state legislature or judiciary" to
warrant a construction that it is "designed to preclude any recovery by pro-
ceedings brought in another state."'190
McCartin and Magnolia coexisted for over thirty years despite their prac-
tical and conceptual inconsistency. McCartin effectively allowed supplemental
awards despite Magnolia's literal reading of section 1738 because few workers'
compensation statutes contain the "unmistakable language" required to give
an award preclusive effect.' 91
A plurality of justices in Thomas voted to permit supplemental awards,
but wished to replace the MeCartin "unmistakable language" test with an ac-
commodation of interests approach. Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of four
justices, concluded that a "straightforward application of full faith and credit"
must yield because the significant interest of the District of Columbia in pro-
viding adequate compensation to the injured worker outweighed both the em-
ployer's interest in limiting its liability and Virginia's interest in the integrity
of its tribunal's determination.' 92 The plurality referred to three characteris-
tics of workers' compensation proceedings that supported the conclusion that a
supplemental proceeding in the District of Columbia did not seriously jeop-
ardize the sovereignty of Virginia's Industrial Commission: (1) no real conflict
existed between the District of Columbia providing supplemental benefits and
the findings by the Virginia Commission because issue preclusion would be
applied to determinations made by the Commission; 193 (2) the limited juris-
diction of a workers' compensation tribunal-its inability to award benefits
under other states' laws---distinguishes its rulings from those of state courts of
general jurisdiction that can consider the applicability of another state's stat-
utes and causes of action;194 and (3) an injured worker often does not exercise
190. Id at 627-28. The Illinois settlement agreement in McCartin provided that it would not
"'affect any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State
of Wisconsin.'" Id. at 624 (quoting settlement contract provision). Presumably, the Court could
have relied upon this provision to distinguish Magnolia and to preserve the employee's claim for
supplemental benefits under Wisconsin law;, instead, the opinion set forth the broader rationale
quoted in the text. The Court concluded that the reservation of rights in the Illinois settlement
agreement was consistent with what was implicit in the Illinois Act itself--that awards in Illinois
are not intended to foreclose additional awards under the laws of other states. Id. at 627-29.
191. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 275 n.21 (only Nevada has "unmistakeable language").
192. Id at 280, 283-85.
193. Id at 281. "A supplemental award gives full effect to the facts determined by the first
award and also allows full credit for payments pursuant to the earlier award. There is neither
inconsistency nor double recovery." Id
194. It was considered inappropriate to apply merger or claim preclusion to the award of
benefits under Virginia law because of this limitation on the jurisdiction of a workers' compensa-
tion tribunal:
Full faith and credit must be given to the determination that the Virginia Commission
had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need not be
given to determinations that it had no power to make. Since it was not requested, and
had no authority, to pass on petitioner's rights under District of Columbia law, there can
be no constitutional objection to a fresh adjudication of those rights.
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an informed, voluntary choice of forum. 195
The analysis employed by the plurality is reminiscent of Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion in Williams II. Justice Stevens considered the nature
of the proceeding, the interests of the individual litigants, and the interests of
the respective sovereigns. Justice Stevens attempted to strike an accommoda-
tion to provide plaintiff with adequate compensation while also doing the least
violence to full faith and credit principles.' 96 This would serve to further the
interests of both plaintiff and the District of Columbia.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, 197 contrasted most sharply with the plurality approach. The dissent re-
jected the balancing of interests approach as without precedent in the full faith
and credit context, and criticized the particular analysis of interests by the
plurality as undervaluing and overlooking important concerns of Virginia
once it had expended resources to resolve the dispute between an employer
and an employee. 198 Justice Rehnquist, although acknowledging that there
are some "exceptional judgments" that are not entitled to full faith and credit,
noted that such exceptions are "'few and far between' "199 and do not support
a reading of full faith and credit that authorizes the Court to conduct a balanc-
ing of the two states' interests. 20
°
Justice White's concurrence, joined by Justice Powell and Chief Justice
Burger, agreed with the plurality that a supplemental award should be permit-
ted, but disagreed with the balancing of interests rationale. These justices ex-
pressed concern that the plurality's approach would undermine full faith and
credit in areas other than workers' compensation so that whenever a former
judgment is pleaded the court would be obliged to balance the various state
interests involved. The concurrence found this approach objectionable be-
Id at 282-83.
195. The Court noted:
Compensation proceedings are often initiated informally, without the advice of counsel,
and without special attention to the choice of the most appropriate forum. Often the
worker is still hospitalized when benefits are sought as was true in this case. And indeed,
it is not always the injured worker who institutes the claim .... This informality is
consistent with the interests of both States. A rule forbidding supplemental recoveries
under more favorable workmen's compensation schemes would require a far more for-
mal and careful choice on the part of the injured worker than may be possible or desira-
ble when immediate commencement or benefits may be essential.
Id. at 284-85.
196. Id. at 285-86.
197. It is striking that Justice Marshall joined with Justice Rehnquist in an opinion adopting a
strict reading of § 1738. Marshall consistently had supported a flexible application of § 1738 in
civil rights actions as a dissenter in Allen and Kremer and as the author of the unanimous opinion
in Haring. Justice Marshall's dissent in Thomas presumably reflects a difference in his attitude
toward the policies that are in conflict with full faith and credit. In his view, the interest of a
second state in providing a supplemental workers' compensation award is not sufficient to ques-
tion application of full faith and credit, but the federal policies behind provision of a federal
forum in Title VII and § 1983 suits are more compelling.
198. Id at 292-93 (Relnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Id at 295 (Relunquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
295 (1942)).
200. Id at 296 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cause it would constitute a "wide-ranging reassessment of the principles of full
faith and credit" 20' and would place the second court, evaluating a full faith
and credit defense, in a position to give "controlling weight to its own paro-
chial interests.
'202
The McCartin rationale troubled the concurring justices. They believed
that the majority opinion in Magnolia was "sounder doctrine, '203 but were
reluctant to overrule McCartin because it had guided state and federal courts
for more than thirty years.2°4 Thus, they would not join either the plurality or
the dissenters; the plurality opinion did too much violence to full faith and
credit principles and the dissent underestimated the value of stare decisis. In
choosing what they perceived to be the lesser of evils, the concurring justices
wanted to leave both McCartin and Magnolia in place because the McCartin
exception to full faith and credit is limited to workers' compensation cases.
Presumably, Thomas is not the final word on section 1738 and workers'
compensation proceedings. The three concurring justices in Thomas indicated
their willingness to reassess full faith and credit principles with the benefit of
briefs and arguments directed to the issue.205 For the moment, however,
Thomas is an ad hoc exception to section 1738 that reflects the peculiar and
sympathetic nature of workers' compensation proceedings and the relatively
minor intrusion into the purpose of full faith and credit that supplemental
awards constitute.
Unlike the jurisdiction exception, which permits a second court to ignore
the first proceeding and enter an inconsistent judgment, the workers' compen-
sation decisions require fidelity to the specific findings of the prior proceeding.
A second state may not relitigate issues of fact or liability that might result in
awarding benefits when a first state has denied compensation.206 Thus, the
workers' compensation exception to the application of the merger aspect of
claim preclusion has no effect on the issue preclusion consequences of a prior
proceeding.
201. Id at 288 (White, J., concurring).
202. Id at 289 (White, J., concurring).
203. Id (White, J., concurring).
204. Id (White, J., concurring).
205. Id at 288 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted:
Hence the plurality's rationale would portend a wide-ranging reassessment of the
principles of full faith and credit in many areas. Such a reassessment is not necessarily
undesirable if the results are likely to be healthy for the judicial system and consistent
with the underlying purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But at least without
the benefit of briefs and arguments directed to the issue, I cannot conclude that the rule
advocated by the plurality would have such a beneficial impact.
Id
It appeared that the Court was prepared to readdress the issues that divided it in Thomas
when it granted certiorari in 1983 to review an award of supplemental benefits. Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga. App. 759, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982), cert. granted 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983), cert.
withdrawn, 104 S. Ct. 476 (1983). The Court, however, subsequently dismissed the writ as improv-
idently granted. 104 S. Ct. 476 (1983).
206. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 280-81; id. at 287 (White, J., concurring).
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C. Prior Application of Full Faith and Credit: State-Federal Litigation
Full faith and credit has yielded on several occasions when deference to a
state court judgment would conflict with a congressional scheme of federal
remedies and federal jurisdiction.20 7 The subordination of preclusion princi-
ples to other federal policies is similar to the balancing and accommodation of
interests analysis in the state-state cases. These federal examples, however, are
less definitive as "exceptions" to full faith and credit because the opinions
have not addressed the applicability of section 1738. Unlike the state-state
cases in which the constitutional clause and the statute have been addressed
directly, the federal cases generally have viewed the issue as a conflict between
federal principles of preclusion208 and a congressional statute that establishes
a federal cause of action and federal jurisdiction, such as the Bankruptcy
Act.20 9 The cases, however, have concluded freely that the common-law pre-
clusion doctrine should yield to the congressional intent to provide a federal
forum. 210
The clearest examples of the flexible application of preclusion when it has
conflicted with federal policies are cases construing exclusive jurisdiction stat-
utes such as bankruptcy, 211 patent and copyright,212 and antitrust statutes. 213
These federal exceptions, however, are not limited to exclusive jurisdiction sit-
uations, but also are recognized when there is concurrent jurisdiction in state
and federal courts and a clear federal interest in providing a litigant the option
of a federal forum.
214
207. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examin-
ers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
208. "Federal principles of preclusion" refers to the common-law doctrines of claim and issue
preclusion as they have evolved in the federal court system. When the prior judgment was ren-
dered by a federal court and a second federal court considers the effect that proceeding has on a
subsequent suit (federal-federal litigation), § 1738 and the constitutional clause are not applicable.
Full faith and credit requires deference to state rules of preclusion only when the prior judgment
emanates from a state court. The second court applies federal common-law preclusion principles
in federal-federal litigation, just as a state court applies its own rules of preclusion to subsequent
litigation within that same jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 87 comment a.
209. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 220-24.
210. The Allen decision was the first instance of a state-federal case analyzed as an implied
repeal issue-whether the federal statute under which the action was brought (§ 1983) was in-
tended by Congress as an implied repeal of § 1738. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
Commentators have noted that this implied repeal analysis is a marked departure from the ap-
proach in prior state-federal cases and therefore have interpreted Allen and Kremer as apparent
signals of less sympathy for implying exceptions to full faith and credit. 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4470 (Supp. 1983).
211. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Bankruptcy Act is discussed along with Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) and Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979), infra notes 217, 220-24
and accompanying text.
212. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982).
213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-402 (1982). Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Lyons v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955), is commonly cited as an exam-
ple of the accommodation of preclusion principles and the interest in a federal forum for antitrust
cases.
214. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 235-42); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 225-34).
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1. Exclusive Jurisdiction 21 s
The jurisdiction of the federal courts generally is concurrent with that of
state courts; claims under federal statutes such as section 1983 may be brought
in either state or federal court. In a few instances, however, Congress has
created statutory actions that may be brought only in federal court. Such a
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts allows greater uniformity of
interpretation by judges with particular expertise in proceedings using federal
procedural standards.
2 16
A state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a claim that falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. A federal statute may even
preclude state consideration of state-law claims in rare situations that involve
issues or defenses that relate to an exclusively federal claim. Determinations
by the state court need not be given full faith and credit in such cases.
2 17
In most instances, however, a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction does
not preclude a state court from considering issues or facts that may be relevant
to the federal claim when they arise in the context of a state-law claim that is
within the state court's jurisdiction. In an action to enforce a contract under
state law a state court may be faced with a defense that the contract should not
be enforced because it constitutes a restraint of trade in violation of state anti-
trust laws. Should the state court's conclusions or findings of fact be given
conclusive effect in a subsequent federal court action on an exclusive jurisdic-
tion claim? The federal interest is in direct conflict with the section 1738 man-
date to give effect to state rules of preclusion in such cases.
2 18
The Supreme Court has not resolved this conflict for all exclusive juris-
215. For discussions of the application of preclusion in exclusive jurisdiction cases based on
nor state proceedings, see generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 210,
4470 (1981); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1978); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction and the Ejfect fPrior State Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REv. 1360 (1967).
216. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 210, § 4470 (extensive discussion
of the advantages of exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain actions in antitrust, patent, securi-
ties, and other areas); see also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 136 n.7 (1979) (statement by Profes-
sor Lawrence King on the need to create a federal bankruptcy court so that its judges could
develop special expertise).
217. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). In Kalb petitioner in a federal bankruptcy pro-
ceeding was defendant in a state court proceeding to foreclose a mortgage on his farm. Id at 435.
The Supreme Court ruled that the language and policy of the Bankruptcy Act demonstrated Con-
gress' intent to deprive state courts ofjurisdiction over such foreclosures during the pendency of
the federal bankruptcy action. Id at 438-44.
The state court in Kalb had determined that it had jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceed-
ings, a finding that usually would be given preclusive effect. Id at 437. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165 ('1938). The Supreme Court concluded that the usual rule of preclusion regarding juris-
dictional findings by state courts had to yield to accomplish Congress' purposes of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction for bankruptcy actions. Kalb, 308 U.S. at 438-40, 444.
218. In Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denieg 350 U.S. 825
(1955), Judge Learned Hand concluded that preclusion should not be applied in a similar situa-
tion. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue and lower federal courts have been divided
in their adherence to claim or issue preclusion in such circumstances. See cases cited in 18 C.
WRIOHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 210, § 4470 (1981); Note, The Res Judicata Efect of
Prior State Court Judgments, 51 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1374 (1983).
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diction cases.2 19 It would be inappropriate to do so as an across-the-board
proposition because the reconciliation of full faith and credit and an exclusive
jurisdiction statute depends on the particular purposes of the statute and the
extent to which preclusion would intrude upon those purposes.
Brown v. Felsen,220 a federal bankruptcy proceeding, is a good example of
the particularized treatment of preclusion issues in an exclusive jurisdiction
case. In Brown a creditor sought to establish that the bankrupt's debt was not
dischargeable under section 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act22 1 because it was the
product of fraud by the debtor. The bankrupt contended that claim preclusion
barred this assertion of fraud because a prior state court proceeding had given
judgment on the debt to the creditor, without allegations or findings of fraud.
Thus, the bankrupt argued that the merger principle of claim preclusion
should bar litigation of new matters that could have been contested in the state
proceeding.
The Supreme Court ruled that claim preclusion should not be applied in
proceedings to determine whether a debt is dischargeable. To give finality to
state proceedings "would undercut Congress' intention to commit [section] 17
219. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
674 (Brennan, J,, dissenting). In Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929), the
Supreme Court ruled that a party to a patent infringement proceeding in federal court could be
estopped by findings of fact made by a state court adjudicating a state-law claim of breach of
contract and fiduciary duty. Id. at 391. Becher has been construed narrowly by lower federal
courts to apply to purely factual findings by state courts. This construction allows litigation of
mixed questions of fact and law as well as federal legal issues in the federal proceeding. For
example, see Judge Learned Hand's influential opinion in Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 222
F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). Becher has been ignored for the most
part by the Supreme Court-in the recent case of Will v. Calvert, 437 U.S. 655 (1978), which
referred to the general issue of preclusion and exclusive jurisdiction, Becher was not considered as
governing. Four of the justices identified as an open question whether it is "ever appropriate to
accord res judicata effect to a state-court determination of a claim over which the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction." Id. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 668 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, on behalf of three of the four justices, expressed "serious doubt" that
res judicata effect ever would be appropriate in these cases, id. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting); he
reasoned that federal courts always should be able to consider purely legal questions de novo and
even questioned the limited fact finding preclusive effect that Becher upheld:
It is at least arguable that, in creating and defining a particular federal claim, Congress
assumed that the claim would be litigated only in the context of federal-court proce-
dure-a fair assumption when the claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. For
example, Congress may have thought the liberal federal discovery procedures crucial to
the proper determination of the factual disputes underlying the federal claim.
Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Neither the Burger nor Brennan opinions referred to Becher in discussing these "unresolved
and difficult" issues, but Brennan cited lower court opinions, including Judge Hand's decision in
Lyons, to support de novo consideration of legal issues in claims under exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 532(a) (1982)):
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
whether allowable in full or in part, except such as. . .(2) are liabilities for obtaining
money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for obtaining money or
property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a
materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition made or published
or caused to be made in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive, or for willful and
malicious conversion of the property of another, ....
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issues to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. '222 The Court found that
one of the purposes of the 1970 amendments to the Act was to "take these
section 17 claims away from state courts that seldom dealt with the federal
bankruptcy laws and to give those claims to the bankruptcy court so that it
could develop expertise in handling them."223 Application of claim preclu-
sion, therefore, would run counter to this legislative purpose by abdicating
federal court consideration when the bankruptcy petition was preceded by
state court collection proceedings.
The Brown exception to full faith and credit, however, is narrowly drawn
to fit the particular inconsistency between claim preclusion and the purpose of
the 1970 amendment to section 17(a). Claim and issue preclusion generally
are applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy, and "in the absence of counter-
vailing statutory policy" 2 2 4 a state judgment in section 17(a) proceedings will
be given preclusive effect if the fraud issue actually was litigated and deter-
mined in state court.
2. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to preclusion doctrine in
cases of concurrent jurisdiction when evidence exists of congressional intent to
provide litigants with a federal forum as an alternative to state court adjudica-
tion. The Court ruled in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examin-
ers225 that a state court proceeding should not be given preclusive effect by a
federal court when a federal plaintiff was forced to litigate issues in state court
under the abstention doctrine announced in Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co. 226
Plaintiffs in England were chiropractors who asserted fourteenth amend-
ment challenges to application of the educational requirements of Louisiana's
Medical Practice Act to their practice. The action in federal court was stayed,
on the basis of Pullman, to permit a state court determination of whether chi-
ropractors, as a matter of state law, were governed by the Act. The Louisiana
state courts ruled that the educational requirements were applicable to chiro-
practors and were not unconstitutional. Thereafter, the federal action was dis-
missed on the ground that the state court judgment on the federal issues
barred relitigation in federal court.227
222. Brown, 442 U.S. at 135.
223. Id. at 136.
224. Id. at 139 n.10.
225. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
226. Under the Pullman doctrine, a federal court refrains from acting on a federal suit when it
contains unresolved questions of state law or construction of a state statute that might modify or
avoid a federal constitutional issue. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See
17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 210, § 4242 (1978); Field, Abstention in Con.
stitutional Cases. The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
The federal court retains jurisdiction when it abstains, but stays federal proceedings until the
plaintiff has litigated the state-law matters in state court. If disposition of the state-law issues by
the state court does not avoid the federal question, the plaintiff then may reactivate the federal
proceeding. England, 375 U.S. at 417.
227. 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge court), rev'd, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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The Supreme Court reversed and allowed plaintiffs to litigate their fed-
eral claims in federal court contrary to the usual preclusion principles. 228 The
Court recognized a substantial interest on the part of litigants to have a federal
court determine claims within the federal jurisdictional statutes. 229 The ab-
stention doctrine is not inconsistent with this interest in a federal determina-
tion of federal issues-Pullman recognized the paramount role of state courts
in adjudicating issues of state law, but it "implies no disregard for the primacy
of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law."2 30 The key ele-
ment in the Court's opinion was the exercise of choice by the federal plaintiff.
"There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has
properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider fed-
eral constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through
no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination of those
claims.",
2 3'
The England exception applies a limited form of issue and claim preclu-
sion to give effect to the choice of forum exercised by the federal plaintiff. If
he "freely and without reservation ' 2 32 submits his federal claim for decision
by the state courts and has it decided there, he will be precluded from re-
turning to federal court. If the plaintiff litigates only state-law issues in state
court and reserves his federal claim, however, he will not be precluded from
litigating the federal claim after completion of state proceedings. 233 In addi-
tion, if the federal plaintiff reserves his federal claim, the federal court may
consider issues of fact as well as issues of federal law, despite any state court
rulings on those factual issues.
234
The Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States,235 a case de-
cided one year before Allen, reiterated the choice of forum principle of Eng-
land in a procedural context similar to, but technically not involving, Pullman
abstention. A contractor on a federal dam project in Montana challenged the
constitutionality of a Montana gross receipts tax on public contractors in state
court. Subsequently, the United States filed an action in federal court against
the State of Montana raising the same issues. The federal action was stayed by
stipulation of the parties pending resolution of the state court proceeding. In
228. The Supreme Court did not refer explicitly to either § 1738 or to preclusion doctrine.
England, 375 U.S. at 422-23. The effect of the Court's ruling, which permitted a party in a state
proceeding to reserve federal claims that arise out of the same dispute as the state suit, was con-
trary to the claim preclusion principle that would bar the subsequent litigation of claims that
could have been brought in the former proceeding. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 17-20.
229. "'When a Federal Court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take jurisdiction.... The right of a party plaintiff cannot be properly
denied."' England, 375 U.S. at 415 (quoting Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40
(1909)).
230. Id. at 415-16.
231. Id. at 415.
232. Id. at 419.
233. A plaintiff's federal claim is not precluded even though he could have joined the federal
claim in the state court action and therefore would be barred from raising the federal claim in
federal court under usual claim preclusion doctrine. See supra note 3.
234. England, 375 U.S. at 417 n.8.
235. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
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that suit, the Montana Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the contractor,
and concluded that the tax did not violate the Constitution.
236
The United States sought to resume the action in federal district court,
but the State of Montana raised a preclusion defense based on the Montana
judgment. The United States Supreme Court concluded that issue preclusion
was appropriate, despite the lack of identity of the parties to the two suits,
because the United States had directed and financed the state court suit on
behalf of the contractor litigant.237 The Court recognized two "special cir-
cumstances" that may "warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclu-
sion"238-the England exception 23 9 and the full-and-fair-opportunity
exception24 0-but concluded that neither exception was applicable in the
Montana litigation.
241
England and Montana recognized that in some circumstances a litigant's
interest in a federal forum may supersede usual rules of preclusion and permit
litigation of issues of fact and law that were not submitted voluntarily to a
state court for adjudication.242 Although both cases involved federal proceed-
ings subsequent to state court judgments, neither considered the application of
section 1738 to the preclusion analysis. Thus, they stand as de facto exceptions
to the literal reading of section 1738.
236. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 P,2d 102 (1973).
The contractor then sued for a refund of certain other tax payments, and the Montana Supreme
Court determined that collateral estoppel and res judicata barred the claim. Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 166 Mont. 260, 531 P.2d 1327 (1975).
237. Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55. The concept of "privity" traditionally was employed to
describe the identity of interests that justified holding a nonparty to a judgment to the same extent
as a party to the action. The Court adopted the functional approach suggested in the RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS draft (now contained in § 39 (1982)) and grounded its holding on
the facts that indicated that the United States had effectively prosecuted the state action in the
name of the contractor. Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55.
238. Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. Justice Marshall considered a third "special circumstance"
that is not relevant to this discussion-when the second court is asked to determine "unmixed
questions of law" in successive actions involving substantially unrelated claims. See ld. at 162
(citing United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)).
239. Montana, 440 U.S. at 163.
240. Id. at 163 n.ll.
241. The adequacy of state procedures was not questioned in the Montana litigation. Id at
163-64. The Court considered the England exception and determined that the United States,
through the contractor, had submitted the federal claim for decision by the state court freely and
without reservation. Id at 163. The opinion indicated that had the United States reserved the
federal claim and not voluntarily submitted the federal issues to the state court, preclusion would
not have been applied. Id at 163 n.10.
242. The possibility of using an Englandreservation of federal issues in a state proceeding as a
means of avoiding preclusion consequences has not received substantial support outside of the
Pullman context. Justice Stewart's opinion in Allen distinguished England in a manner that ap-
peared to limit its significance solely to Pullman cases. Alien, 449 U.S. at 101 n.17. Some lower
courts have indicated, subsequent to Allen, that a state court defendant should be able to reserve
federal claims in the same manner as an involuntary state litigant under the Pullman abstention
doctrine. See Southern Jam, Inc. v. Robinson, 675 F.2d 94, 97 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982); but see Howell
v. State Bar of Texas, 710 F.2d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1983) (Englandreservation device only applies
in event of Pullman abstention).
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D. Summary
This review of state-state and state-federal decisions demonstrates that
section 1738 has not been followed strictly when to do so would infringe on
certain important state or federal interests. Therefore, the conclusion in Allen,
Haring, and Migra that section 1738 governs preclusion issues in section 1983
cases does not mean that state preclusion rules always must be applied. Sub-
stantial precedential support exists for the Court's statement in Haring that a
federal court need not follow state law if to do so would violate the legislative
purposes of a federal statute such as section 1983. Whether there is justifica-
tion for a section 1983 exception to section 1738 is a policy question that
should be approached in the same manner that the Court has approached the
other exceptions to full faith and credit: would the legislative purpose of sec-
tion 1983 be thwarted by strict application of section 1738, and can the choice-
of-forum purpose of section 1983 be accommodated within full faith and
credit principles?
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND 28 U.S.C. § 1343
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, in-
cluded the predecessors to sections 1983 and 1343.243 It was enacted as part of
the Reconstruction Era effort to enforce the rights guaranteed to freed Negroes
by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. 244 The statute created a federal
243. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1-6, 17 Stat. 13-15 (1871). Section 1 of the Act established
the cause of action (§ 1983) and federal court jurisdiction to hear such claims (§ 1343):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any jurisdiction of the United States to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the
several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights
of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts,
under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six,
entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to
furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United States
which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
There are several excellent articles that review the history and construction of § 1983. See
Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482
(1982); Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity, Two for the Federalism See-Saw, 25 Loy. L. REv.
659 (1979); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Claims (pt. 2), 60 VA. L. Rav. 250 (1974); Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive
in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 185 (1974); Comment, Res Judicata
and Section 1983: The Effect 0/State Court Judgments on Federal CivilRights Actions, 27 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 177 (1979); Comment, The Collateral-Estoppel Effect to be Given State-Court Judgments in
Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 1471 (1980); Comment, Federalism-
§ 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Un-
derlying Right, 43 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1035 (1982); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Judg-
ments on Subsequent 1983.4ctions, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 610 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The
Preclusive Effect]; Note, Section 1983 and Federalisnr The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U.
FLA. L. REv. 904 (1976); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
RBv. 1133 (1977).
244. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII:
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cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who deprived
an individual of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and established juris-
diction in the federal district courts to hear claims for damages or injunctive
relief for violation of those rights.
Federal courts were not a vehicle for enforcing federal constitutional
rights prior to the Reconstruction Era. At their inception in 1789, federal
courts had no authority to hear federal question or civil rights cases. They
were intended primarily to be neutral tribunals for admiralty claims and for
disputes between litigants from different states.245 When the Bill of Rights
was added to the Constitution by amendment, the enumerated rights were
protected against infringement by the federal government, but not against ac-
tions of state and local governments. 246 Thus, prior to the Civil War no fed-
eral cause of action existed against state officials who violated the
Constitution. Individual rights were recognized and enforced by the states,
not by federal courts, under the original scheme of the Constitution.
The Civil War and the ensuing Reconstruction amendments and legisla-
tion effected a dramatic shift in this original allocation of judicial power over
individual rights.247 The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
guaranteed certain rights vis-t-vis the states and also authorized Congress to
enforce those guarantees through appropriate legislation.248 Congress exer-
§ 1 Slavery abolished
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
§ 2 Enforcement
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV:
§ 1 Citizenshop rights not to be abridged by states
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
§ 5 Power to enforce article
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
245. The First Judiciary Act of 1789 established these original bases for federal jurisdiction.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-35, 1 Stat. 73-93 (1789).
246. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (fifth
amendment due process clause does not govern actions of state or local government in taking
private property).
247. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80
(1961).
248. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id amend. XIV, § 5 (for text of these sections see
supra note 244). See also id amend. XV, which provides:
Section 1. The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
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cised that authority by enacting a series of civil rights statutes249 which estab-
lished federal causes of action for violations of constitutional rights.
The purpose of the federal causes of action, such as section 1983, was to
permit private enforcement of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
250
The intent of the jurisdictional grant in section 1343 was to make federal
courts available for the vindication of federal rights because state courts could
not be trusted.25 1 The congressional debates at the time of passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 recognized that in many states the Ku Klux Klan had a
persuasive influence over all branches of government, including the judiciary.
State courts were part of the problem addressed in the Act because of their
failure to recognize and enforce the rights of Negroes.
252
The jurisdiction created in section 1343 and the federal question statute
enacted in 1875253 is concurrent with the jurisdiction of state courts over fed-
eral constitutional issues. The legislation neither mandated that these federal
claims be brought in federal court nor deprived state courts of authority to
consider federal issues. The hope and assumption was expressed by members
of Congress that some state courts would be receptive to claims of federal
rights and therefore state court resolution would continue to be available.
254
Concurrent jurisdiction in conjunction with the removal statutes passed
during the same time period 255 permitted either party to a section 1983 action
249. Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875); Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Act of
May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
250. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180
(1961).
251. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374-76 (1871). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
240-42 (1972).
252. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972).
253. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). The present version of the federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
254. See.411en, 449 U.S. at 100 n.16.
255. The present versions of the removal statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 (1982).
Section 1441 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removeable [sic] without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
Section 1443 provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a
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to opt for a federal forum. The plaintiff has the initial choice of filing in state
or federal court. If the plaintiff files in state court and the defendant prefers
federal consideration, the defendant may remove the action to federal court as
a matter of right.256 If the plaintiff files in federal court, however, the action
remains there despite the defendant's possible preference for state court.
Thus, the effect of section 1343 and the removal statutes is not to mandate
a federal forum for section 1983 actions, but rather to create the federal court
option as an alternative to a state forum. Several Supreme Court decisions
have relied upon the choice-of-forum purpose of sections 1343 and 1983 to
conclude that the availability of state remedies does not affect the section 1983
litigant's right to elect a federal forum and federal relief.
257
This choice-of-forum principle also was the basis for the Court's conclu-
sion in Mitchum v. Foster258 that section 1983 constitutes an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Statute. 259 This statute prohibits a federal court from grant-
ing an injunction to stay proceedings "in a state court "except as expressly au-
thorized by Act of Congress" or when necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to
protect its judgments.260 Although section 1983 does not explicitly authorize
federal injunctions against state court proceedings, it does provide for equita-
ble relief against violations of the Constitution. In Mitchum the Court re-
viewed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and concluded
that the Act was intended to protect against constitutional deprivations occa-
sioned by state courts as well as by state legislative and executive actions. 261
The Court concluded that section 1983 was a "uniquely federal remedy
'262
that could be given its intended scope and accomplish its purpose only if it
were recognized as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute.
This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly con-
ceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the
Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it
was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those
rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to
right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or
of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such
law.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
257. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-507 (1982) (§ 1983 actions are
exceptions to usual requirement that litigant must exhaust state administrative remedies before
filing in federal court); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (injunctive relief under
§ 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (§ 1983 is a federal remedy supplemental to state-law remedies; availabil-
ity of relief under § 1983 is not dependent on the unavailability or inadequacy of state-law
remedies).
258. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982): "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
260. Id
261. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240.
262. Id at 239.
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the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings ex-
tended to the state courts.
2 6 3
Thus, Mitchum stands as a strong affirmance of a litigant's right to have a
federal court, rather than a state court, determine his federal claim under sec-
tion 1983.
The Younger 264 doctrine, however, with its concern for federal-state com-
ity, has tended to overshadow this choice-of-forum principle when there are
pending state proceedings. A section 1983 action in federal court, by its very
nature, has a high potential for creating federal-state friction because a federal
judge is invited to supplant the decisions and judgment of a state official based
on his own interpretation of the Constitution's standards. The Supreme Court
in Younger v. Harris and subsequent cases has restricted access to federal court
to avoid such friction when there is a state proceeding involving important
state interests in which the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportu-
nity to raise the federal issues.
265
The inroads made by the comity doctrine into the choice-of-forum princi-
ple of section 1983 have been debated extensively by members of the court and
commentators. 266 The strongest criticism of the deference to state court adju-
dication is that Congress passed sections 1983 and 1343 specifically to alter the
relationship between state and federal courts; therefore, it is not proper for the
Supreme Court to substitute its present view of federal-state comity for that
enacted into law by Congress in 1871.267
Patsy v. Board of Regents26 8 was a watershed case in this debate. It reaf-
firmed earlier interpretations of section 1983 concluding that no need exists to
resort to state administrative procedures before filing a suit in federal court.
263. Id. at 242.
264. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
265. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982);
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In MeNary, for example, plaintiffs who
raised due process and equal protection challenges to local real property tax assessments were
barred by comity from bringing a § 1983 action in federal court because state administrative and
judicial remedies were "plain, adequate and complete." 454 U.S. at 116. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, on behalf of five justices, presented the issue as a direct conflict between precedent estab-
lishing a rule of access to federal court in § 1983 actions and the comity principle that bars federal
courts from granting injunctive and declaratory relief in a state tax dispute. Id. at 105. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that access to federal court should yield to the judicial doctrine of restraint
because of the importance of taxation to the operation of state and local governments. Id at 116.
266. Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Younger, 401 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bartels, Avoiding a
Comity of Errors: A Modelfor Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits That "Tnteere" with State
CivilProceedings, 29 STAN. L. Ray. 27 (1976); Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L. 1552 (1977); Morrison, Rights Without
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts out of the Business of Protecting FederalRights, 30 RUtErams L. Ray. 841 (1971); Neuborne, The ProceduralAssault on the WYarren Legacy:
A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HOFSTA L. Rnv. 545 (1977); Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STANq. L. Ray. 1191 (1977); Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts,
60 N.C.L. Ray. 59 (1981); Comment, Restriction ofAccess to Federal Courts: The Growing Role of
Equity, Comity and Federalism, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 320 (1977).
267. See, ag., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
268. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
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The Palsy Court relied on the legislative history of section 1983 for its conclu-
sion that the statute should be an exception to the traditional, judicially cre-
ated doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. 269 Seven of the
justices in Patsy recognized that, even though comity considerations weighed
in favor of requiring resort to state administrative remedies, it was Congress'
and not the Court's role to establish such a barrier to the section 1983 litigant's
access to a federal court.
270
The Allen, Haring, and Migra decisions did not question the choice-of-
forum purpose of section 1983; they held that the unrestricted choice that ex-
ists under the concurrent jurisdiction provisions is affected by prior state pro-
ceedings. Many instances exist in which applying preclusion would not be
inconsistent with section 1983 because the litigants had exercised some choice
of forum in the prior proceeding and had been provided an adequate opportu-
nity to raise their federal claim. Thus, a blanket exception to section 1738-an
implied repeal for all section 1983 actions-is not necessary to fulfill the legis-
lative purposes of sections 1343 and 1983.
Situations may arise, however, in which strict application of preclusion
would thwart section 1983's intent to provide a federal forum as an alternative
to state courts. Allen and Haring appropriately suggest that an accomodation
between full faith and credit and section 1983 should be made in those indi-
vidual cases in which the legislative purpose of section 1983 is implicated.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO APPLICATION OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
This review of the history and construction of sections 1738 and 1983
indicates that there is ample justification for the two exceptions to the applica-
tion of state preclusion rules recognized in Haring. Thus, when there was not
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue in the prior proceeding
in state court, or when preclusion would contravene the understanding of sec-
tion 1983 regarding choice of a federal forum, preclusion is not required. Al-
though the full-and-fair-opportunity exception is well established by prior case
law, it has been construed narrowly. The greater ambiguity concerns the legis-
lative purpose of section 1983 as a basis for relaxing state rules of preclusion.
For this reason, the full-and-fair-opportunity standard will be considered only
briefly here, while the justifications for, and the scope of, the understanding-
of-section-1983 exception will be discussed more fully.
A. Full-and-Fair-Opportunily Exception
The full-and-fair-opportunity standard has been applied by the Supreme
Court in several contexts in which deference to prior judicial proceedings is at
269. Id at 502-07.
270. Justice Marshall's opinion on this point, id at 502-07, was joined in the concurring opin-
ions of Justice O'Connor, id at 516-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, J.), and
Justice White, id at 517-19 (White, J., concurring). Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger dis-
sented, id at 519-36 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
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issue: federal habeas corpus, 27 1 Younger abstention,2 72 and federal issue pre-
clusion doctrine. 273 Although it may be subject to varying constructions and
applications in these contexts, the full-and-fair-opportunity test was given an
exceedingly narrow scope in section 1738 cases by the Kremer opinion.
2 74
The Kremer decision justified this exception as a constitutional restriction
on state courts and limited the exception's scope to the most fundamental due
process. Such a minimal standard does not require comparable procedures to
those available in federal court under section 1983.275 For example, a state
may have an expedited process for eviction actions that does not allow for
pretrial discovery and that provides for informal summary hearings. This pro-
ceeding presumably does not deny a litigant due process even though a de-
fendant in such an action may be handicapped in his ability to litigate fully
federal defenses to his eviction.276 All rulings in the summary eviction pro-
ceeding, therefore, must be given full faith and credit under Kremer's applica-
tion of the full-and-fair-opportunity standard.
This development of a narrow scope for the full-and-fair-opportunity
standard negated earlier indications by the Court that the full-and-fair-oppor-
tunity standard might serve as a vehicle for a more searching review of the
"quality, extensiveness and fairness" of prior state proceedings before giving
them preclusive effect.277 This narrow application also calls into question the
conclusion of Justice Stewart in Allen that the full-and-fair-opportunity excep-
tion is adequate fo fulfill the legislative purposes of section 1983.278 It is ap-
parent from Justice White's opinion in Kremer and from lower court
implementation of the standard279 that the full-and-fair-opportunity test will
271. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
272. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (applica-
tion of Younger abstention doctrine).
273. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
274. Justice White rejected Kremer's assertion that he was not provided a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate his discrimination claims in the state judicial review proceedings: "[S]tate pro-
ceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by
federal law." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
275. See id at 483 ("We must bear in mind that no single model of procedural fairness, let
alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause.").
276. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
277. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11(1979). See Note, The Preclusive Effect,
supra note 241, at 642-52.
278. Justice Stewart concluded that while he recognized that there was "grave Congressional
concern" in 1871 that state courts were not enforcing constitutional rights:
[In the context of the legislative history as a whole, this congressional concern lends only
the most equivocal support to any argument that, in cases where the state courts have
recognized the constitutional claims asserted and provided fair procedures for determin-
ing them, Congress intended to override § 1738 or the common-law rules of collateral
estoppel and res judicata.
Allen, 449 U.S. at 99.
279. The following lower court opinions apply the full-and-fair-opportunity standard as a
minimum requirement easily satisfied: Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1983);
Brown v. St. Louis Police Dep't, 691 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1882 (1983);
Davis v. U.S. Steel, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 1256 (1983); Lee v. City of
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recognize only the most blatant procedural inadequacies. Standing alone, it
does not accomplish the congressional purposes of sections 1983 and 1343.
B. Underslanding-of-Section-1983 Exception
Debate concerning the justification for a section 1983 exception to rules of
preclusion often is based on one's opinion regarding the adequacy or inade-
quacy of state courts to protect federally guaranteed individual rights. The
majority in Allen concluded that the full-and-fair-opportunity test was suffi-
cient to fulfill the intentions of section 1983 because the Court was confident
that state courts would competently and sympathetically adjudicate federal
constitutional claims.
280
The dissent in Allen argued that Congress "plainly anticipated more than
the creation of a federal statutory remedy to be administered indifferently by
either a state or a federal court."'28 1 Sections 1983 and 1343 were designed to
provide an option to escape state court adjudication when constitutional rights
were jeopardized by actions of state officials. According to the dissent, the
choice of a federal forum was created not solely out of concern for procedural
regularity, but also because "Congress believed that substantive justice was
unobtainable [in the state courts].
''282
These conflicting attitudes concerning the role of state courts are the basis
for debates over other comity-based doctrines, such as Younger abstention and
federal habeas corpus, in which the procedural adequacy of state considera-
tion of federal issues is the basis for denying a federal forum. Supreme Court
opinions during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger frequently have rejected
arguments for access to federal court in section 1983 cases. The decisions have
been based implicitly on the following logic: The conditions that led to the
enactment of the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes and concurrent juris-
diction have abated; even the more recent racial discrimination problems in
the South that led to the expansive interpretations of those civil rights statutes
in the 1960s have been corrected; and state courts have demonstrated that they
are worthy of the respect and deference that underlies our federalist system;
therefore, federal courts should defer or abstain from exercising jurisdiction in
many cases that technically fall within their statutory jurisdiction.
Critics of the Court's comity-based rulings have challenged the "myth of
parity"283 between state and federal courts in constitutional adjudication.
They perceive the Court's comity doctrine as an effort to divert federal issues
into state court systems that are likely to produce less expansive constructions
of constitutional rights.2
84
Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982); Dash v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Appeals Bd., 683 F.2d
1229 (9th Cir. 1982).
280. Allen, 449 U.S. at 105.
281. Id. at 107 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. Id at 108 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
283. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
284. See Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: Conservative Dominance (1969.79),
21 SANTA CLAsA L. REv. 891 (1981); Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism, 21
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The rationale for an understanding-of-section-1983 exception to rules of
preclusion, however, need not be based on a negative evaluation of state court
judges as protectors of federal rights in the 1980s. It is the congressional intent
in enacting section 1983 and not the Supreme Court's current view of federal-
state relations that should govern the reconciliation of full faith and credit and
a litigant's interest in choosing a federal forum.
Patsy v. Board of Regents285 reiterated the primacy of congressional in-
tent in determining issues of access to federal court in section 1983 actions.
The majority in Patsy recognized that it was debatable as a policy matter
whether section 1983 plaintiffs should be required to exhaust state administra-
tive remedies prior to filing in federal court.286 Seven justices, however,
agreed that the 1871 Congress did not intend federal courts to bar parties until
after they had pursued state procedures; instead, the majority concluded that
policy arguments based on present federal court caseloads and notions of fed-
eral-state comity should be addressed to Congress, not to the Supreme
Court.
28 7
Thus, the ultimate justification for Justice Marshall's additional exception
to state rules of preclusion based on the understanding of section 1983 is the
congressional intention to provide section 1983 litigants with an opportunity to
escape from state court adjudication. s88 Even when a state court proceeding
provided a minimum of due process, an involuntary party to that proceeding
may have a strong interest in not being precluded from federal court consider-
ation of his federal claim.
B.C.L. REV. 763 (1980); Mahoney, 4 Sword as Well as a Shield- The Offensive Use of Collateral
Estoppelin Civil Rights Litigation, 69 IowA L. REv. 469 (1984); Monaghan, The Burger Court and
"Our Federalism," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer, 1980, at 39; Morrison, supra note 266;
Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in ConstitutionalLitigation: The Role of Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Neuborne, supra note 266;
Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual Rights: The Burger Court's Treatment of the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 VA. L. REv. 865 (1982).
285. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Patsy was decided after Allen, but before Haring.
286. Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, concurring, id at 516-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring,
joined by Rehnquist, J.) and Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, id at 532-36
(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.), indicated that they support an exhaustion require-
ment as a matter of policy. Justice Marshall's opinion on behalf of four justices, id. at 512, and
Justice White's concurrence, id. at 518 (White, J., concurring), noted that there are strong argu-
ments both for and against requiring exhaustion.
287. See supra note 270.
288. Compelling arguments exist to continue concurrent jurisdiction and provide a choice of
forum that do not rest on assumptions of the inferiority of state courts, even without the historical
background of the Klan-dominated courts of the Reconstruction Era. Concurrent jurisdiction
allows two court systems to grapple with similar problems and develop legal doctrine somewhat
independently. This dual development creates increased opportunities for innovation and experi-
mentation and ultimately provides the Supreme Court with more models and approaches to con-
sider before it establishes standards that will be binding on both state and federal systems. See
Cover, The Uses of Jurirdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology andInnovation; 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 639 (1981).
In addition, a choice of forum permits a plaintiff to optimize his chance of establishing a
constitutional claim. Congress has decided that allowing an aggrieved party the choice of state or
federal court systems maximizes the vindication of individual rights against majoritarian action.
A strong preference exists to provide civil rights plaintiffs with a federal forum, in the free market
that now exists, because these plaintiffs believe that they have a better chance of winning in fed-
eral court.
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Haring did not explore the scope of a section 1983 exception to the appli-
cation of state law. The Supreme Court's flexible application of full faith and
credit, however, provides a range of possibilities. In some instances, the sec-
ond forum has been permitted to adjudicate legal and factual issues de novo
without any deference to the judgment in the prior proceeding. 289 Another
accomodation has been to give prima facie weight to findings in the first ac-
tion, similar to the treatment of foreign judgments at common law.
290
The most common balance struck between full faith and credit and con-
flicting state or federal interests has been to defer to rulings on matters actually
litigated and determined by the first court (issue preclusion), but to consider
claims not litigated in the state court that otherwise would be barred under
claim preclusion. In Brown v. Felsen291 the Supreme Court concluded that it
would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress, as expressed in section 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act, to preclude consideration by a federal bankruptcy judge
of fraud issues that could have been determined, but were not determined, in a
state proceeding. The Court indicated that had the fraud issue actually been
litigated and determined in state court, the state adjudication might have been
dispositive and not subject to relitigation in the bankruptcy action.
292
The Migra Court rejected a construction of section 1738 that would have
created a blanket exception to the application of claim preclusion in section
1983 actions. The accommodation of the competing values of sections 1983
and 1738 does not lend itself to a single formula or rule for all cases. A deter-
mination whether to permit litigation under this exception should consider all
factors relevant to a particular case before deciding whether, and to what ex-
tent, the choice-of-forum purpose of section 1983 justifies a relaxation of state
rules of preclusion.
V. PROPOSED METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Preclusion issues in state-federal litigation under section 1983 should be
289. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964),
(see supra text accompanying notes 225-34); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (see supra
note 217); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174 (1850) (see supra text accompanying notes 157-
61).
290. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (see supra text accompanying
notes 171-82).
291. 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (see supra text accompanying notes 220-24).
292. Id at 139 n.10. The plurality opinion in Thomas adopted a similar rule for workers'
compensation cases and held that a second tribunal need not treat a claim for supplemental bene-
fits as having merged with the prior award, but required adherence to specific findings made by
the first tribunaL Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1980). Issue pre-
clusion is applied to contested determinations of jurisdictional facts made by the initial court in
the jurisdiction cases, including divorce. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Similarly, in
England the right to litigate federal issues in federal court was not subject to claim preclusion
when a proper reservation of the claim had been made. The litigant will be subject to issue pre-
clusion, however, if he freely submits the federal issues and they actually are determined by the
state court. England, 375 U.S. at 419. See comment of Justice Stevens, Denial of the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982), denying cert. to 674 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir.). Justice Stevens indicated that the application of resjudicata to § 1983 actions is not suscep-
tible to a single answer, but will depend on the nature of the prior state proceedings as well as the
interests that are at stake in the action.
[Vol. 63
PRECLUSION IN SECTION 1983 CASES
resolved in a two-step process: first, determine whether the claim or issue
would be precluded under the law of the state that rendered the prior judg-
ment; and second, determine whether there is sufficient justification for a dif-
ferent federal rule to supplant state doctrine.
293
The initial application of state law to the preclusion issue usually will be
straightforward. A state statute may establish the preclusion rule.294 Because
claim and issue preclusion are common-law doctrines, however, it is more
likely that a federal court will be forced to look to state court decisions for
guidance. The task a federal court undertakes when reviewing such precedent
is analogous to that under the Erie doctrine: the federal court must apply the
same "rules of decision" as the courts of the state in which it sits.
295
The Haring opinion demonstrates that the process of "reading the minds
of state court judges," which often is problematic in the Erie context,296 may
be simpler under section 1738 because general principles of claim and issue
preclusion are well established in all states. A federal court, even in the ab-
sence of direct state court precedent, can reach reasonably confident conclu-
sions about the application of state preclusion doctrine. Uncertainty is most
likely to arise when the common-law doctrine is evolving and there are no
recent state court decisions.297 In such situations, it is appropriate for federal
courts to look to trends in other jurisdictions and the federal courts for gui-
dance in predicting the development of state court doctrine.
298
If a federal court determines that the party's claim would not be pre-
cluded under state law, the federal court also should permit the litigation. It is
uncertain whether a federal court, consistent with 1738 and due process, ever
could apply a "more preclusive" federal rule to bar litigation that would be
permitted under state law.299 In litigation under section 1983, however, it
293. Haring, 103 S. Ct. at 2372-75.
294. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67.
295. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); C. WRIGrr, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 55 (1983).
296. C. WRIGHT, supra note 295, § 58. See, e.g., Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293
(1961); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944); Vandenbark v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 311
U.S. 538 (1941); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Gustin v. Sum Life Assur-
ance Co. of Canada, 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946).
297. For example, see the Supreme Court's discussion of Ohio claim preclusion doctrine in
Migra. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 896-99. Ohio case law was evolving from the traditional narrow
concept of the same "cause of action" toward the broader "same transaction" standard of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. The Court did not attempt to resolve the close claim
preclusion question raised under Ohio law, but remanded for the district court to address that
issue in the first instance. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 898-99.
298. Haring, 103 S. Ct. at 2373. The same process is followed in Erie cases. See Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring); C. WRIGHT, supra note 295, § 60.
299. Justice White's concurring opinion in Migra stated that prior decisions of the Supreme
Court had established that the language of§ 1738, which requires the "same full faith and credit,"
bars preclusion by a federal court when state law would not do so. Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 899-900
(White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's discussion of a more preclusive federal rule in the
second portion of his opinion in Hating, however, implied that the Supreme Court might permit a
more preclusive federal rule if there had been more compelling policy justification. Haring, 103 S.
Ct. at 2375-78. See the discussion of this issue supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. The
Haring decision is ambiguous on this point in its earlier reference to Union & Planters' Bank of
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would be inappropriate to do so because section 1983 was drafted specifically
to provide the option of a federal rather than a state forum.3°°
If state law would preclude the claim or issue before the federal court, the
applicability of exceptions to full faith and credit then should be considered.
The starting point in this analysis should be a strong presumption in favor of
applying the state doctrine. This presumption is supported not only by the
language and construction of section 1738, but also by conflict of laws princi-
ples301 that usually dictate application of the rendering state's doctrine to pro-
mote comity between court systems and finality in the resolution of disputes.
It also is appropriate and fair to bind the parties to the initial forum's preclu-
sion doctrine on the presumption that they conducted the litigation on the
basis of that jurisdiction's preclusion rules.
A federal court should not preclude, however, when it finds that the party
being precluded did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or
issue, or if consideration by a federal court is warranted by the choice-of-
forum purposes of sections 1983 and 1343. Application of the understanding-
of-section-1983 exception should be based on consideration of the following
five variables that are suggested by the Supreme Court's decisions construing
sections 1738 and 1983: the choice of forum; the conflict between state and
federal adjudication; the state court consideration of the issue or claim; the
burden on the litigants; and the rights being asserted and interests at stake.
A. Choice of Forum
The original congressional purpose of sections 1983 and 1343 was to pro-
vide the party asserting a violation of federal rights the option of litigating in
federal or state court. How heavily courts should weigh that interest against
those interests underlying section 1738 depends on the degree to which the
party facing preclusion exercised some choice of forum in the first proceeding.
In some situations the party voluntarily submitted the federal issue to the
state court and, therefore, no basis exists for an exception to state preclusion
rules. This would be the case when the party being precluded was the plaintiff
who initiated the first action and raised the federal issues; or, was the defend-
ant in state court who had the opportunity to remove the action to federal
court, but did not; or, was the defendant in the prior proceeding who filed a
permissive counterclaim involving the federal issues. The party being pre-
Memphis v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71(1903). Haring, 103 5. Ct. at 2373 n.6. For discussions of the
possibility of a federal court applying a more preclusive rule, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 86
comment g; 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILER & E. COOPER, supra note 210, § 4467; Currie, Res Judicata:
The NeglectedDfense, 45 U. CH. L. Rv. 317, 326-27 (1978); Jackson, FullFaith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1, 30 (1945); Shapiro, supra note 115, at
235-39; Vestal, R~es Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law 4pplied in Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. Rnv. 1723, 1736-38 (1968).
300. Justice White supported his decision to allow a more preclusive federal rule by noting
that the precluded party would be free to litigate the claim or issue in state court. Migra, 104 S.
Ct. at 900. This result would be contrary to § 1983's legislative purpose--to provide a federal
forum as an alternative to state court.
301. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 93, 98 (1971).
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cluded in these instances made a decision under jurisdictional and joinder
rules that resulted in state litigation of the federal claim or issue.30 2 Thus, it is
fair to hold him to his choice of forum and the application of its preclusion
rules unless he can escape preclusion under the full-and-fair-opportunity test.
A litigant's interest in a federal forum is most compelling in cases in
which the party facing preclusion did not litigate the federal issue in state
court voluntarily. This setting would include England-type cases in which a
federal plaintiff is forced to litigate in state court under Pullman abstention
and also would include cases in which a party faces a claim preclusion defense
after he has chosen not to litigate federal claims in the prior state proceeding-
for example, if he did not file a federal counterclaim as a defendant in state
court or if he filed only state-law claims as a plaintiff.
30 3
The voluntariness of the submission of federal claims or issues to the state
court often will be a matter of degree, particularly in the case of defenses that
involve federal issues that may be raised in response to a suit based on state
law. Defenses always are raised voluntarily, but pressures on the defendant
often make the voluntariness of his choice of that forum problematic. The
defendant in criminal proceedings is "free" not to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the statute under which he is being prosecuted, or not to move to supress
evidence seized without a search warrant. The defendant may be able to pre-
serve his right to sue in federal court to have the statute declared unconstitu-
tional or to obtain damages for violation of his fourth amendment rights by
not raising such issues. He forfeits the use of that defense to block the state
prosecution, however, and his subsequent federal relief does not reverse the
302. In the first example, a plaintiff who files a federal claim in state court has the choice of
filing in either federal or state court. The state defendant who can remove (for example, under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) when the suit raises a federal question and originally could have been filed in
federal court) effectively has the choice of litigating in state or federal court. A decision not to
remove is an exercise of choice. Similarly, a defendant who files a permissive counterclaim is
under no compulsion to raise it in the state action; he could have fied it separately in federal
court.
303. In determining whether a litigant has exercised the choice of forum provided by § 1983
and § 1343, it is tempting to base the conclusion on whether he was the plaintiff or the defendant
in the prior proceeding. Justice Blackmun appears to have resorted to such over-simplification
when he attempted to reconcile his dissent in Allen with his position in Migra:
The rationale of that dissent, however, was based largely on the fact that the § 1983
plaintiff in that case first litigated his constitutional claim in state court in the posture of
his being a defendant in a criminal proceeding. See 449 U.S. at 115-116. In this case,
petitioner was in an offensive posture in her state court proceeding, and could have pro-
ceeded first in federal court had she wanted to litigate her federal claim in a federal
forum.
Migra, 104 S. Ct. at 898 n.7.
A decision by a plaintiff to raise only state-law claims in state court is consistent with the
guarantee of § 1983 and § 1343 of a federal forum for federal claims. If a plaintiff fies a § 1983
suit in federal court simultaneously with a suit raising state-law claims in state court, it would be
inconsistent with the legislative purpose of § 1983 and the Supreme Court's decision in Englana
see supra text accompanying notes 225-34, to bar the federal suit because it could have been joined
with the state claims in state court. Arguably, Justice Blackmun's lack of sympathy with Dr.
Migra's effort to avoid preclusion was because her § 1983 action was not litigated contemporane-
ously with the state suit, and was viewed as a belated effort to recover more than she had from her
victory in state court.
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criminal conviction obtained in the absence of that defense.3 4
The degree of voluntariness that can be inferred from a realistic appraisal
of different litigation situations should be reflected in the weight given this
factor in accommodating the interests underlying section 1738. In cases in
which the absence of a choice of forum in the state proceeding is clear, the lack
of voluntariness should be a significant point in favor of allowing the section
1983 litigation. The interest in providing a federal forum may be outweighed
more easily by concerns for finality and comity that are embodied in section
1738 if there is ambiguity about the voluntariness of the litigation of the fed-
eral issues in state court.
The Allen Court concluded that in state-federal litigation the interests
promoted by section 1738 are comity and the policies underlying the preclu-
sion doctrines---conserving judicial resources, relieving parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, and encouraging reliance on adjudication by
preventing inconsistent decisions.305 A court attempting to accommodate sec-
tion 1738 with the choice-of-forum purpose of section 1983 should consider
the effect that the litigation will have on these policies. It is important, how-
ever, to distinguish the state's interest in its preclusion rules and the different
perspective that a federal court should take in section 1983 state-federal
litigation.
In developing its rules of preclusion, a state court system addresses a fun-
damental tension between the policies identified by the Supreme Court, which
favor finality and repose, and concerns for fairness and justice, which may
favor reconsideration in light of information that suggests that the correct out-
come may not have been reached in the prior proceeding. 30 6 A state's preclu-
sion doctrine, with its general rules and exceptions, is an effort to strike a
balance on the basis of the state court's perception of the interests at stake. A
section 1983 exception to state rules of preclusion recognizes that different in-
terests are at stake in a section 1983 action in federal court, and a different
accommodation from that made by state doctrine may be appropriate.
Some of the policies that might motivate a state in establishing its preclu-
sion rules and exceptions may be of little or no concern to a federal court. A
state's interest in conserving its judicial resources is a significant factor in
enumerating the parameters of its preclusion doctrine. Claim and issue pre-
clusion compel the litigation of related claims in a single proceeding, give fi-
304. Compare Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (federal plaintiff had raised a fourth
amendment issue in a motion to suppress evidence in the state criminal prosecution) with Haring
v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983) (federal plaintiffhad not raised a fourth amendment objection to
certain evidence and pleaded guilty). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), in which
a Jehovah's Witness was permitted to challenge the constitutionality of a New Hampshire crimi-
nal statute in federal court even though the federal issue could have been raised, but was not, as a
defense in his state court prosecution. The federal action was allowed, in part, because the relief
requested, a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the statute, would not overturn defendant's
conviction or collaterally attack the state court judgment. Id at 711. It is unlikely that any of
these parties based their decisions to raise or not to raise a constitutional claim in the state pro-
ceeding on the availability of a subsequent § 1983 claim.
305. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
306. RESTATEMENT, supra note I, Introduction at 11-13.
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nality to rulings made in the course of the proceeding, and promote efficiency.
An exception to preclusion that permits the litigation of matters previously
adjudicated or matters that could have been joined in a prior action is a deter-
mination that some countervailing policy justifies the additional expenditure
ofjudicial effort. No reason exists in state-federal litigation to defer to a state's
determination of how it wants to allocate its judical resources, since it is the
federal system that will be spending its time and money on the section 1983
litigation.
The distinction between the federal and state courts' perspectives in set-
ting their own rules is particularly significant in analyzing claim preclusion
defenses. The arguments for deference to state preclusion rules are diminished
greatly when the issue or claim in question never has been considered by a
state court.
B. Conflict Between State and Federal Adjudication
The central purpose of the full faith and credit statute was to require con-
formity with state court judgments, both out of respect for the sovereignty of
other state court systems and to avoid the friction that could result from con-
fficting judgments. If permitting federal litigation would undermine a state
court judgment, this factor would weigh heavily in favor of preclusion. On the
other hand, if the federal action would not relitigate issues or claims already
determined by the state court and, therefore, would not result in inconsistent
rulings, this concern for deference to state proceedings would yield more easily
to countervailing federal-forum interests.
30 7
The focus on the potential for conflicting judgments explains the differing
treatment afforded issue preclusion and claim preclusion in section 1738 deci-
sions. When the second proceeding considered claims or issues that had not
actually been litigated in the prior state proceeding, such as the supplemental
workers' compensation claim in Thomas308 and the bankruptcy action in
Brown,309 the interests of the second forum were considered sufficiently impor-
tant to outweigh application of the merger aspect of claim preclusion. The
Supreme Court, in both Thomas and Brown, relied on the lack of serious con-
ffict between the second proceeding and determinations by the prior state tri-
307. See Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full
Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 87-96 (1982). Professor Atwood's article, written after the Allen
and Kremer decisions but before Haring and Migra, recognized the inapplicability of the full faith
and credit clause in situations in which permitting the federal litigation will "not contradict actual
determinations of the state court or disturb the finality of the judgment." Id at 109. She further
concluded that exclusive jurisdiction statutes should be treated as implied repeals of § 1738 and
that claim preclusion should be inapplicable when such jurisdiction is invoked after a state pro-
ceeding. She also stated, however, that claim preclusion should be applicable in § 1983 actions
because they are within the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts.
Her position, similar to Migra, is not inconsistent with this Article to the extent that it con-
cludes that § 1983 is not a blanket exception to § 1738. For the reasons presented in this Article,
however, sufficient flexibility remains in the application of § 1738 to allow for individual excep-
tions to preclusion based on the understanding of § 1983.
308. Thomas, 448 U.S. 261 (see supra text accompanying notes 191-206).
309. Brown, 442 U.S. 127 (see supra text accompanying notes 220-24).
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bunal.310 The Court, however, has indicated in both the workers'
compensation and bankruptcy contexts that issue preclusion may be applied
when the federal proceeding creates the risk of results that are in direct conflict
with state court determinations.311
The weight placed on this desire to avoid inconsistent rulings will vary
according to the nature of the conflict created. The risk of inconsistent rulings
is of greatest concern when the federal action is a collateral attack on the state
judgment itself; it is of significantly less concern when the federal claim was
not litigated or decided. Somewhere between these extremes are cases in
which litigation of a federal claim not already adjudicated by the state court
would involve reconsideration of a subsidiary finding by the state court. The
possibility of conflicting findings of fact often will not be as significant a con-
cern as conflicting judgments. The Court permitted the federal plaintiff in
Englandto relitigate issues of fact subsidiary to the federal claim even though
the state court had made findings on those same issues.312 Under the England
holding, however, the federal court may not permit a collateral attack on a
state court judgment in which the state court actually adjudicates the federal
claim itself.313
C State Court Consideration of the Issue or Claim
The nature of the state court's consideration of the claim or issue is criti-
cal to the interests underlying both section 1983 and section 1738. The legisla-
tive purpose of section 1343's establishment of federal jurisdiction for section
1983 claims was to permit escape from potentially biased or unsympathetic
state judicial systems. This purpose supports reconsideration by a federal
court if the state proceeding was limited in its scope and procedures, or if the
federal issue was relatively insignificant. If the federal issues were the main
focus of plenary state proceedings and were considered sympathetically and
completely, however, this concern is of less significance.
The potential for friction and the affront to state sovereignty that accom-
panies a decision not to follow a state ruling also vary in relation to the quality
and extensiveness of state court consideration of the claim or issue. If the
claim or issue was tangential to the state proceeding and was determined with-
out explanation or analysis, the ruling may not merit the same deference as
one that was central to the state proceeding and that was the subject of exten-
sive discovery, argument, and discussion.
314
310. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 280-81; Brown, 442 U.S. at 133.
311. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 280-81; Brown, 442 U.S. at 138 n.10.
312. Englana 375 U.S. at 417.
313. Id at 418.
314. In an opinion respecting the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Castorr v.
Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982), denying cert. to 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), Justice Stevens argued
that the "character of the earlier state proceedings," as well as the "character of the federal consti-
tutional claim" affect the applicability of claim preclusion of a § 1983 action. Justice Stevens
concluded that "[d]ifferences in procedures and in standard of review in prior state proceedings in
different cases may affect the degree to which federal courts should apply res judicata." Castorr,
103 S. Ct. at 241 & n.2. Justice Stevens' Castorr position mirrored the position taken by Justices
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The full-and-fair-opportunity exception to preclusion inadequately ad-
dresses this problem because of its minimal requirements and its all-or-noth-
ing consequences. 315 Full preclusive effect is accorded as long as the state
proceeding provided minimal due process. It is more realistic to recognize
that, although a state proceeding may provide minimally adequate due pro-
cess, it may not provide comparable consideration of all issues subsidiary to its
judgment.
316
Therefore, as to this factor, the interests underlying sections 1983 and
1738 are consonant. When the state court consideration of the federal issue is
less extensive or tangential, the interest of the litigant in an independent fed-
eral determination is greater and the deference merited by the state ruling is
less significant. Conversely, when the state court consideration of the federal
issue is plenary and well focused, the party's interest in a federal forum is
diminished and the state determination is entitled to greater deference.
D. Burden on Other Litigants
Permitting further litigation may cause additional cost and vexation for
the defending party who otherwise would be protected by state rules of preclu-
sion. Relitigating the matters actually contested and decided in state court
would be direct duplication and difficult to justify. On the other hand, al-
lowing a separate suit in federal court on claims not considered by the state
court might not create a substantial burden on the defendant. As long as issue
preclusion is applied to specific findings made by the state court, no need exists
to duplicate the evidence presented there. In many situations the federal pro-
ceeding will consist primarily of putting a federal gloss on the state court's fact
findings with some supplementation of evidence.
This consideration weighs more heavily against an exception to preclu-
sion of matters already decided by a state court. Permitting the litigation of
matters not adjudicated previously does not add significantly to the defending
party's litigation burden and is more easily justified by the choice-of-forum
policy articulated by Congress in section 1983.
E Nature of Rights Being Asserted and Interests at Stake
The preclusion doctrines, as much as any procedural area, are influenced
Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan in the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in Kremer.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 486-508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 275-79.
316. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introductory Note to ch. 6 at 265. The Supreme Court
employed an analysis similar to that suggested in this Article in McDonald v. City of West Branch,
104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803-04 (1984). A unanimous Court concluded that an arbitration award should
not be given claim- and issue-preclusion consequences in a § 1983 action, in part because an
arbitration proceeding does not provide fact-finding comparable to that of a judicial proceeding.
Although acknowledging that arbitration proceedings may provide adequate due process to the
parties, the Court determined that such proceedings are not an adequate substitute for a federal
trial because the record in arbitration proceedings is not as complete, the usual rules of evidence
do not apply, and procedures such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testi-
mony under oath are often severely limited or unavailable. Id. at 1804.
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by the substance of the issues and claims being litigated.3 17 This influence is
particularly appropriate to recognize and legitimize in analyzing preclusion
issues in section 1983 actions because the legislative purpose of section 1343
and the removal statutes was to provide an escape from state court adjudica-
tion because of the substance of the claim asserted-relief from unconstitu-
tional state laws and conduct of state officials.
This consideration raises little question about the preclusive consequences
of those findings in which a prior state proceeding adjudicated purely factual
matters within the scope of state court jurisdiction. If the state court determi-
nation involved application of federal substantive law to those facts, however,
there is a federal interest in having that determination comport with federal
policies. Additionally, the federal policies at stake in the state proceeding,
such as prohibitions against racial discrimination or suppression of free
speech, weigh in favor of providing a federal forum despite state rules of claim
preclusion if a federal claim based on those facts never actually was litigated
in state court.
It is widely recognized that the substantive federal claim affects applica-
tion of preclusion rules in state-federal litigation.318 It is more difficult, how-
ever, to move from that generalization to a more particularized statement
regarding how to weigh the nature of the claim in the balancing of interests in
favor of and against preclusion.319 The most that can be said is that, consis-
tent with the legislative purpose of section 1983, federal courts have played a
special role in enforcing certain substantive norms, particularly ones protect-
ing individual liberties against majoritarian state legislative and executive ac-
tion. Freedom of speech, equal protection, and due process guarantees against
state infringement traditionally have been vindicated more frequently in fed-
eral courts than in state courts, presumably because the countervailing inter-
ests of the state have been given greater deference by state courts than by
federal courts.
320
317. Id at 266 ("What can be stated generally is that such substantive concerns have a legiti-
mate place in determining whether the rules of claim and issue preclusion should be given their
ordinary effect in a multi-forum context.").
318. Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982) ("character of the federal constitutional claim"
affects applicability of claim preclusion in § 1983 action), denying cer. to 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir,);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 86 comment b.
319. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS concluded that "the fact that federal sub-
stantive interests are at stake is a factor militating in some degree, against treating the state court
judgment as conclusive." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 86 comment b, at 305. The RESTATE-
MENT did not formulate any specific standard for deciding when federal interests were sufficient to
justify an exception to preclusion on this basis, however, because "given the variousness of federal
policies, it is impossible to frame generalizations as to the weight that a state adjudication should
have in the face of an arguably overriding federal concern." Id at 305-06.
320. Id at 305-06. See, e.;., Ferguson v. Winn Parish Police Jury, 589 F.2d 173, 176 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Principles of res judicata are not strictly applied in voting rights cases because their
application would unfairly deny the members of a large class fundamental constitutional rights
merely because counsel representing the named plaintiffs in the case made a legal error."); Local
1006, A.F.S.C.M.E. v. Wurf, 558 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Il. 1982) (court did not explicitly address
importance of rights, but attached significance to issues at stake-first amendment and racial dis-
crimination claims). See also cases cited in Comment, Res iudicata and Section 1983: The Effect
of State Court Judgments on Federal CiviIRightsActions, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177, 211-212 (1979).
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This consideration, in conjunction with the nature of the state court con-
sideration of the issue, recognizes that the question of the deference given to a
state court ruling should have both procedural and substantive considerations.
The weight accorded a state judgment should depend on an analysis of the
"quality and intensiveness of the opportunity to litigate" 32 1 in the state and
federal actions as well as the particular substantive policy that the federal
court is asked to vindicate in the second proceeding.
The nature of the interests at stake may not always weigh in favor of
permitting the federal litigation. The state's interests that are involved in a
section 1983 action may be matters of particular importance to the functioning
of state or local government. If so, the comity concerns that are the basis for
Younger abstention and that underlie section 1738 may favor deference to the
prior state court judgment. The nature of the claim also may weigh in favor of
preclusion because of the consequences that further litigation would have on
either the litigants or on third parties. Arguments for a section 1983 exception
to rules of preclusion in child custody cases have not been embraced because
"prolongation of [such] litigation might have a serious adverse effect on the
emotional and physical health of the child."
322
VI. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Issue preclusion and claim preclusion fare quite differently in the applica-
tion of this Article's proposed analysis to common state-federal litigation situ-
ations. Potential exists for directly conflicting judgments and the defending
party is faced with the expense of redundant litigation when an issue in the
federal proceeding was actually litigated and determined in the prior action.
The focus of issue preclusion analysis, therefore, is whether the factors of
choice of forum, nature of the state court consideration, and the interests at
stake are sufficiently compelling to permit relitigation. Conversely, under this
analytic framework, when an issue or claim has not been adjudicated by a
state court but would be subject to claim preclusion, the concerns regarding
inconsistent rulings and the burden on the defendant are diminished and it is
more likely that the interest in a choice of forum will control. This conclusion,
however, does not translate into a simple rule that issue preclusion will apply
in section 1983 actions, but that claim preclusion will not.
Assume that a tenant, whose lease with a public housing authority was
not renewed, believes that the housing authority took that action in retaliation
for her tenant-organizing activities. She may be able to challenge that action
under state law as a breach of her lease or a violation of state statutes, and also
under the Constitution as an infringement of her right to freedom of speech.
These claims could be the basis for an affirmative suit in state or federal court
and also could be defenses to an eviction action by the housing authority.
Assuming that tenant brings a section 1983 claim in federal court subsequent
321. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, Introductory Note to ch. 6 at 265.
322. Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240 (1982), denying cert. to 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.).
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to a state proceeding, what preclusive effect should the state court considera-
tion have on the federal suit? A literal reading of section 1738 mandates that
the preclusion consequences should be the same as the state court would ac-
cord the previous judgment. The analysis developed in this Article, however,
suggests that no single answer can be given to that question; whether to defer
to the state rules depends on "the character of the earlier state proceed-
ing" 323-who chose the state forum and what was the context and the extent
of consideration of the federal issues in that proceeding. To test this proposal,
consider its application in two typical situations: federal section 1983 litiga-
tion after tenant was a defendant in a state eviction proceeding and after ten-
ant was a plaintiff in an affirmative suit in state court.
Assuming that tenant was the defendant in a prior eviction proceeding in
which she successfully raised the retaliation defense based on her lease and
state statutes, may she subsequently sue for damages in federal court on her
first amendment claim? Tenant would be precluded under state preclusion
doctrine in most juiisdictions if the damage claim is considered a compulsory
counterclaim.
Tenant would have a strong argument under the analysis proposed in this
Article that she could avoid preclusion on the basis of the understanding-of-
section-1983 exception. The variables of choice of forum, lack of conflict be-
tween state and federal rulings, nature of the state court consideration, and the
right being asserted all support allowance of federal litigation. Tenant had no
control over the initial forum and, as an involuntary litigant, did not submit
the federal issues to the state court as either a defense or a counterclaim. Be-
cause the prior court did not address the federal claim, there is no risk that the
federal proceeding would result in a confficting judgment; a decision to award,
or not award, damages would not undermine the state court determination not
to evict her. The constitutional free speech nature of the claim also supports
providing tenant with a federal forum. The only factor that might weigh in
favor of preclusion is the burden on the housing authority to litigate the dam-
age claim in a separate proceeding. This inconvenience and expense would be
minimal, particularly if issue preclusion were applied to avoid relitigation of
factual findings by the state court. Thus, permitting tenant to litigate her fed-
eral claim in a second action would promote the choice-of-forum interest be-
hind section 1983 and would not intrude seriously on the interests underlying
section 1738.
A closer question arises if tenant actually had litigated the free speech
issue as a defense and the state court had found that the first amendment had
not been violated and ordered her eviction. Issue preclusion doctrine nor-
mally would bar any relitigation of the federal issues in a subsequent section
1983 action. An exception to preclusion based on section 1983 would be un-
likely because the factors are balanced more evenly and weigh less strongly in
323. Id at 241.
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favor of permitting relitigation. An exception to preclusion could be justified
only if the state court consideration of the federal claim was extremely limited.
Whether tenant exercised a choice of forum by raising her free speech
defense is ambiguous-she was not a voluntary litigant in the eviction, and
although she did raise the issue on her own, it is realistic to recognize that it
was raised under the pressure of probable eviction without the defense. Thus,
although she has an interest in obtaining a federal forum for her first amend-
ment claim, that factor does not weigh as heavily in her favor as it would had
had she refrained from raising the defense in the eviction proceeding.
Allowing a second suit would create a risk of inconsistent rulings because
a damage award only could be premised on a finding that the nonrenewal of
tenant's lease violated her first amendment rights-a direct contradiction of
the state court holding. On the other hand, a federal ruling would not be a
collateral attack on the eviction judgment itself, as long as the federal court is
not asked to keep tenant in her apartment. It would burden the housing au-
thority, and be much more of a duplication of litigation than if claim preclu-
sion were involved, if tenant was permitted to relitigate issues from the
eviction.
The factor that supports an exception to preclusion is the nature of the
claim. The substantive federal interest in protecting free speech would be pro-
moted by a federal court assessment of the conduct of the housing authority
against the standards of the first amendment. This substantive interest would
not be sufficient to justify relitigation, however, unless there were reasons to
question the fairness and completeness of the state consideration of the federal
issue. For example, if tenant were handicapped severely in her ability to de-
velop and present the free speech defense, as in a case in which the eviction
proceeding did not permit discovery and provided an expedited summary
hearing, a federal court should allow the litigation of the federal claim under
the federal rules of procedure.
Another approach to preclusion arises if the prior state proceeding was
not an eviction action brought by the housing authority but was an affirmative
suit by tenant for injunctive relief or damages, or both, as soon as she was
notified that her lease would not be renewed. Tenant could join her federal
and state law claims in a single suit in either state or federal court. If she chose
instead to split her claim and bring separate actions based on state law in state
court and on the section 1983 claim in federal court, and the state court was
the first to enter a judgment, claim preclusion normally would bar the federal
court from considering the section 1983 claim because it could have been
joined with the state claim in state court. This preclusion would apply regard-
less of whether the state court ruling was favorable to tenant.
A review of the factors suggested in this Article indicates that, in this
setting, tenant should be permitted to litigate the section 1983 claim in federal
court, but that she could be bound as a matter of issue preclusion to the factual
and legal findings made by the state court. Although she was a voluntary
litigant in state court, she exercised the choice of a federal forum established
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by section 1343 by filing her section 1983 claim in federal court. Her interest
in having a federal forum consider that claim is comparable to that of the
plaintiffs in England, whose filing in federal court and decision not to litigate
their federal claim in state court protected them from normal preclusion
doctrine.
The key question in this analysis is whether tenant's decision to file the
state claim in state court, rather than as a pendent claim in federal court, di-minishes her interest in having a federal court adjudicate the federal issues. It
should affect the issue preclusion analysis because she voluntarily submitted
the factual and legal issues underlying her state-law claim to the state court.
Thus, no choice-of-forum basis exists to justify relitigation of the state court
findings. Splitting her federal and state claims, however, is entirely consistent
with her interest in choosing a federal forum; permitting the application of
claim preclusion in such a case would defeat the legislative purpose of section
1983. Therefore, tenant has a strong argument for determination of her fed-
eral claim by the federal court on the basis of the choice-of-forum principle.
The analysis of the remaining variables would be quite similar to the
cases in which tenant did not litigate the federal issues in the state proceeding.
As long as issue preclusion is applied, an exception to claim preclusion to al-
low litigation of the section 1983 claim would not create a risk of inconsistent
judgments, significantly burden the housing authority, or be inconsistent with
the substantive federal interest in protecting free speech.
A different result occurs if tenant had submitted the federal issue to a
state court for determination. She would have no apparent basis for escaping
preclusion if she included the federal issue in an affirmative suit in state court
or if she raised it as a permissive counterclaim in an eviction proceeding. The
choice-of-forum interest would not weigh in her favor because in both in-
stances she exercised control over the forum in the prior proceeding. The in-
terest in avoiding inconsistent judgments would be jeopardized if issue
preclusion were not applied to the state court's determination of the federal
issue.
These examples of voluntary submission of the federal issue to a state
court are stronger cases for preclusion than when tenant raised the federal
issue as a defense to the eviction. In the latter, she was involuntarily a party to
the state proceeding and raised the federal issue under the duress of probable
eviction without that defense. If tenant included the federal claim in an af-
firmative suit in state court, however, she would be choosing the state forum
and litigating the federal issue under no compulsion. In a permissive counter-
claim situation, she would be in state court involuntarily as a defendant but
under no duress to file the federal claim in that tribunal because, as a counter-
claim, it would not be waived or precluded if not joined in the state
proceeding.
The analysis proposed in this Article does not provide clear answers to
preclusion questions in all settings. The premise of this approach is that in this
area simplicity of rules will be at the expense of justice. The legislative pur-
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pose of section 1983 can be achieved with minimal intrusion into full faith and
credit principles if cases raising preclusion issues are analyzed in the manner
suggested. Consideration of the variables identified would clarify and inform
the discretionary decision of a federal court whether the understanding of sec-
tion 1983 justifies an exception to state rules of preclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Allen, Haring, and Migra have shifted
the focus of preclusion analysis in section 1983 cases from federal common-
law principles to the full faith and credit statute. Despite the literal reading of
that statute adopted in some decisions, section 1738 does not necessarily man-
date that state doctrine be dispositive of preclusion questions. The Supreme
Court historically has applied section 1738 with flexibility so that state rules of
preclusion have been ignored or modified when full faith and credit conflicts
with other important state and federal interests. An exception to state rules of
preclusion may be justified in light of the choice-of-forum purpose of sections
1983 and 1343 depending upon the particular circumstances of the prior pro-
ceeding. The applicability and scope of such an exception should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the degree to which
the party being precluded exercised choice over the state court forum, the ex-
tent to which the federal action could lead to inconsistent judgments in the
state and federal proceedings, the nature of the state court consideration of the
federal issue, the burden on the defending party, and the nature of the federal
right being asserted.
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